“We’re All Going To Die": Discourses Of Planetary Crisis And The Formation Of Collective Imaginaries by Huber, Abbey & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
 
 
 
 
 
“We’re All Going to Die:”  
Discourses of Planetary Crisis and the Formation of Collective Imaginaries 
 
 
 
by 
 
Abbey Huber 
 
 
Honors Thesis 
 
Appalachian State University 
Submitted to The Honors College 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Bachelor of Science 
 
May, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Rebecca Witter, Ph.D., Thesis Director 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
Dana Powell, Ph.D., Second Reader 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
 
Jefford Vahlbusch, Ph.D., Dean, The Honors College 
 
2 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………..………3 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………………4
Chapter One |  Introduction: System Change, Not Climate Change………………….……...5 
 Theoretical Foundations..………………..………………………………………………………9 
 Methods and Approach…………………………………………………………………………16 
 Chapter Overview……………………………………………………………………………….21 
Interlude I | “Frogs in a Pot”..…….…………………………………….……………………..23 
Chapter Two | Emergency ……………………………………………………………………..24 
 Sacrifice, Suspension, and State Responsibility……………………………………………….27 
 Mobilizing From Below…………………………………………………………………………30 
 States of Emergency and Positive Sacrifice……………...……………………….……………32 
 States of Exception and Negative Sacrifice………………....………………………………….34 
 Legal Suspension as Normalcy…………………………………………………………………40 
Interlude II | Freeze-Dried Blueberries.………………………………………………………43 
Chapter Three | Apocalypse …………………………………………………………………...45 
 Apocalypse...Now?...................................................………………………...…………………..45 
 Apocatainment…….. …………………………………………………………………………...51 
 Preppers and Preparedness…………………………………………………………...………..56 
 Troubling Pre-Apocalyptic Normalcy …………………………………………………………62 
Interlude III | Cigarette Smoking and the Roth IRA …..……………………………………66 
Chapter Four | Extinction……………………………………………………………………...67 
 The Sixth Mass Extinction……………………………………………………………………...67 
 Extinction and the Environmental Movement………………………………………………...71 
 Charismatic Species …………………………………………………………………………….75 
 Human Extinction and Doomer-ism…………………………………………………………...78 
Interlude IV | Multi-Casualty Triage Systems………………………………………………..87 
Chapter Five | Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...89 
 “Humans Are the Virus”: COVID-19 Discourse and EcoFascism…………………………..89 
 “Sacrifice the Weak”……………………………………………………………………………92 
 Apocalyptic Normalcy and Existential Threat….…………………….……………………….95 
 Settler Normalcy and Nihilist Exceptionalism………………………………………………...98 
 Escalation vs. Exceptionalism: Pushing the Limits of Collective Imagination……………...99 
Works Cited……………………………………………………………………………………103 
 
 
 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores discourses of planetary-scale crisis with a focus on climate change, 
the threat of mass extinction, and the COVID-19 pandemic. What stories are being told about 
planetary-scale crisis? How are these stories produced and reproduced? What are their 
implications? I answer these questions with an exploratory analysis of crisis storytelling in the 
US. The stories people tell about planetary crisis matter, because they are the groundwork, the 
means, and the justification for how people come to understand and interpret, experience, and 
respond (or not) to crisis. Drawing from diverse sources (digital media and social networks, 
Hollywood film, collaborative organizing tools, social media posts, memes, and academic texts), 
analysis is organized of these stories into three emergent themes: Emergency, Apocalypse, and 
Extinction. First, mobilization around the declaration “Climate Emergency” underscores the 
clear need for the state to take responsibility for leading the transition to a fossil fuel free 
economy. At the same time, there is also reason for concern over the state’s abuse of power. 
Second, apocalyptic entertainment shapes future imaginaries that center the “normalcy” of the 
white cisheteronormative man, while some modes of preparation individualize the need to do all 
they can to prepare. Third, diverse responses to mass extinction (from conservation to 
“doomerism”) ultimately protect the status quo. A significant common thread of US planetary 
crisis discourse is a sense of “existential exceptionalism,” a term Mary Heglar (2019) uses to 
describe the false novelty of collective existential threat that the environmental movement 
assigns to climate change. The logic of existential exceptionalism enables, first, the obfuscation 
of the fact that planetary crisis has been ensured and protected by systems like neoliberal 
globalization.  Second, it accepts an orientation towards preparing for crisis that protects the 
status quo version of a post-crisis return to “normalcy”. Existential exceptionalism can also be 
characterized as a part of Joseph Masco’s “ crisis in crisis,” (2017) in which media cultures are 
over-saturated with crisis-talk, the political sphere is limited, and languages for collective self-
improvement are abandoned. These discourses have serious implications for limiting collective 
imaginaries, or the ability to understand and to respond in community to planetary crisis. This is 
an relevant conversation to the recently emergent COVID-19 pandemic, as well as to 
speculations about the co-creation of a post-pandemic planet. 
 
Keywords: Planetary Crisis, Climate Change, Mass Extinction, COVID-19, Collective 
Imaginaries, Existential Exceptionalism, Normalcy, Storytelling, Neoliberal Globalization 
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CHAPTER ONE | INTRODUCTION: SYSTEM CHANGE, NOT CLIMATE CHANGE 
On September 20th, 2019, an estimated 4 million people across the world took to the 
streets to demand climate action as a part of the Global Climate Strikes. I was one of those 
people. Along with other members of Appalachian Climate Action Collaborative or “ClimAct” 
(a local grassroots climate justice coalition), I co-organized the strike in Boone, NC. Boone is the 
small US college town where I worked (until Covid-19) and where I still (remotely) attend 
Appalachian State University. 
I remember being pleasantly surprised by the numbers that we drew –  estimated at 
several hundred– college students, “locals,” professors with their kids, and people who traveled 
in from surrounding rural towns and counties gathered on the green lawn outside the public 
library. A few of my collaborators had made a large banner that said read, “Give Change a 
Chance, Give Earth a Chance.” Several carried homemade signs:  “Denial is not Sustainable,” 
“Planet Over Profit,” and “There Are No Jobs on a Dead Planet.” A few folks toted paper mache 
puppets of endemic species threatened by climate change and mass extinction - a Spruce Fir 
Moss Spider, a Hellbender, and even a large stony face with moss for hair that represented 
nearby Grandfather Mountain.  
I remember that the megaphone (of which we only had one) produced a loud, ringing 
sound when I spoke into it. I fumbled my way through a set of five demands co-produced by US 
Youth Climate Strike Coalition1, the group that organized many of the US climate strikes: 1) the 
US adoption of the “Green New Deal,” 2) respect for indigenous land and sovereignty, 3) 
environmental justice, 4) protection of biodiversity, and 5) a shift to sustainable agriculture.2 I 
                                                
1 US Youth Climate Strike Coalition is a collaboration between 8 major youth-led climate groups facilitated by the 
mobilization group, The Future Coalition (Janfaza 2019). 
2 Strikewithus.org, accessed September 1, 2019.  
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then goaded the crowd to begin marching down our single main street, King Street, to the 
Watauga County Administrative building and Watauga Co. Courthouse. I intended for us to rally 
there before moving on again. I also requested that the crowd attempt to leave space on the 
sidewalk for other pedestrians, as I wanted to avoid any confrontation with the town police at 
that event. But as they turned and headed away in a mass, there was a moment of panic. Had I 
unleashed a sizable crowd onto our small town with too little direction? 
And so I ran, fighting my way to the front of the friendly mob of directionless strikers. I 
hoisted the shoddy megaphone over my head. “When I say ‘system change,’ you say ‘not climate 
change!” Then we proceeded, spread out over blocks, still pouring off the sidewalks into the 
street. My call: “System Change”. Their response: “Not Climate Change!” My call: System 
Change. Their response, Not Climate Change. System Change. Not Climate Change. And in that 
moment it felt unreal, walking down a street I walked every day, but this time with a crowd of 
climate strikers along with me. After a block or two, I found my footing. And when we came out 
on the other end of King Street, I had lost my voice.  
I was initially unsure about this event because I wasn’t sure what purpose it would really 
serve. I felt uneasy about the (reasonably so) with the prospect of accidentally replicating empty, 
photo-op activism for our own sakes. But what I quickly found was that the crowd that had 
gathered was alive with energy. They were ready to rally and to “fight back.” We were striking 
in solidarity with the rest of the global 4 million and we were striking for us. Many were looking 
for a place to have collective conversations about climate change, and, consistently, people were 
storytelling. I heard stories about climatic disruption to Christmas tree farming the next county 
over. I heard stories about local politics, and the potential of a new asphalt plant being built by 
the elementary school. I heard stories about how to stay connected. Moreover, collectively, as we 
7 
 
took King St., the hundreds gathered in my town that day told several stories about climate 
change that day. That it’s a multigenerational and multispecies concern worth leaving work early 
for. That lives are at stake - Spider, Salamander, and Human. That leadership is lacking at some 
levels, emergent at others. And that addressing the crisis requires a change in the political and 
economic systems hinged to carbon, to exploitation, and to profit over persons. 
When I read the local paper’s article about the event, I also read the comments section. 
The stories being told in the comments were very different stories. Many were stories that 
aligned with climate denialism. In the US in particular,3 campaigns of strategic obfuscation have 
spun doubt and distrust in the validity of climate science, resulting in the emergence of climate 
denialism (or as denialists sometimes prefer to position, “skepticism”) (Conway and Oreskes 
2010). In denialist discourse, climate change might be storied as a political tool, or a conspiracy 
theory. 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the political implications of discourses of 
“planetary crisis.” These planetary-scale phenomena cannot be held in a human palm, in fact, 
they cannot really be seen. Rather, they are primarily perceived and known through layers of 
experiences (with super-storms, disappearances, and droughts) and through information imparted 
discursively (through a graph, an oral story, or a news report). Timothy Morton (2013) referred 
to climate change and other planetary crises as “hyperobjects” - things whose spatial and 
temporal boundaries are so large, undefined, and uncertain that they trouble ordinary conceptions 
of what a “thing” even is. Knowing a “hyperobject” is extra-ordinarily complicated. And how 
“planetary-scale crisis” is known influences how both individuals and social collectives react. 
                                                
3 Also significantly present in other countries considered to be in the “Anglosphere” (Great Britain, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada). (Ghosh 2016:141.) 
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This thesis project enters into the field of storytelling through an analysis of discourses 
concerning “planetary crisis.” I ask, What stories are being told about “planetary crisis”? How 
are the stories produced and reproduced? And what are the implications of these stories about 
planetary crisis? I approach these questions through exploration of artifacts and sites of discourse 
and storytelling, including social media interactions, films, organizing tools, memes, and 
academic texts. I also draw from fields of scholarship that ask similar questions - including 
anthropology, political ecology, literary studies, and Science and Technology Studies (STS). 
What I have found is that stories about planetary crisis are constantly co-created, and that they 
have influence over the way that people imagine and their capacity to respond to crisis. Because 
of this power over collective capacities to imagine, stories about crisis and social change have 
political implications. 
 I find in the process of this project that discourse and stories on planetary crisis are sites 
of negotiation and tension between different perspectives on normalcy, the role of the state in 
society, and on the nature of crisis itself. One common trend in crisis discourse is what Mary 
Heglar calls “existential exceptionalism” (2019) - the (false) sense of novelty attributed to the 
existential threat posed by planetary crisis. I argue that existential exceptionalism erases the 
systemic drivers of planetary crisis and furthers what Joseph Masco refers to as the “crisis in 
crisis” (2017), a state in which languages for collective improvement and positive futurities are 
left behind. Existential exceptionalism and the crisis in crisis limit the capacity of collective 
imaginaries to imagine alternatives to contemporary “normalcy” and positive futurities in the 
face of planetary crisis.  
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Theoretical Background 
Discourse, Storytelling, and Planetary-Scale Crisis 
I understand discourse as a framework for understanding the intimate relationship 
between knowledge and power, as a “set of social and cultural practices and norms that limit and 
shape what can be said (i.e., what seems normal, legitimate, and truthful, and what does not), in 
ways we are quite unaware of unless we challenge ourselves,” (Sheppard et al 2009: 52). This is 
a conception of discourse canonically attributed to postmodern scholar Michel Foucault, whose 
discursive analysis is particularly attuned to relationships of power and “truthmaking” (1980: 
132). Essentially, some discourses have shaped understandings and meanings systems (or 
“epistemes”) which are legitimized as “truth,” while other discourses are marginalized (Foucault 
1980: 132). Therefore, discourse analysis in this sense examines how “truth” is determined, how 
that “truth” shapes human behavior, and how “alternative” discourses are devalued, but also have 
the potential to contest and challenge dominant truths. In terms of planetary crisis, power and 
discourse direct conceptions of not only the conditions of the crisis itself, but also what is 
possible in reaction.  
Storytelling is a discursive practice which makes particular use of narrative for creating 
and conveying meaning. Stories are affective forms of communication. In a recent article about 
storying climate change, a group of ASU professors explained: “Stories allow us to see and be 
with climate change. Stories connect people across difference and resonate through time. They 
call us to care for, respond to, and become responsible to one another” (England et al. 2019: 21). 
Master storyteller Ursula LeGuin argued, moreover, that words in the form of discursive 
expressions are not just framings, they are events that “... do things, change things. They 
transform both speaker and hearer” (2004: 199) by relaying ideas and information as well as 
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energy, understanding, and emotion back and forth and by amplifying it (Le Guin 2004). Thus, 
stories are lively and shared.4 They represent, project, and inform collective yearnings, collective 
fears, and collective imaginations. By collective imaginations I mean the capacity to co-create or 
envision something collaboratively, in this case specifically positive futurities.  
 
Neoliberal Globalization and the Coloniality of Power 
 Throughout this thesis I refer to “the systems” which drive planetary crisis. When I write 
this, I am pointing to the context of planetary crises - that most if not all facets of contemporary 
planetary crisis are the result of social forces and human activity. However (as the many critiques 
of the designation “Anthropocene” point out), some humans and some types of human activity 
are far more responsible for planetary conditions than others. Simply put, fossil fuel companies 
are far more responsible for climate change than a subsistence farmer in, say, Nepal. The 
structures I am most concerned about in this thesis are neoliberal globalization and settler 
colonialism. The values and operation of both (e.g., the consolidation and commodification of 
                                                
4 A litany of other scholars writing about planetary crisis also work (and play) with modes of storytelling and their 
relation to human (and multi-species) collectives in their theoretical projects. Activist Joanna Macy makes an 
intervention on collective imaginaries by telling “three stories” - that of “Business as Usual,” “The Great 
Unraveling” (crisis), and “The Great Turning,” emphasizing that “The Great Turning” is the story for unworking the 
other two and actively hoping for positive futurities (Macy and Johnstone 2012). Donna Haraway turns to science 
fiction as a particular type of fiction which fits into “SF” - a theoretical lens or mode intended to counter neoliberal 
autopoiesis (self-production and maintenance) with “sympoiesis” (M. Beth Dempster’s collectively produced system 
with no boundaries), in part by writing at the edges of literature and academia (2016). Haraway also prompts the 
reconsideration of collectivity with her call to “make kin” outside of blood ties, outside of species, and to therefore 
build a more powerful collective (2016). Other STS writers, including Isabelle Stengers and Bruno Latour, take up 
the story of “Gaia” to story planetary crisis. The Gaia Hypothesis, as James Lovelock and Lynn Margulis presented 
it, was the Earth as an autopoietic, self-regulating organism (Gaia). However, Stengers renders Gaia as an 
“intruder”, while Latour uses Gaia as a figure to illustrate the obsolescence of “Nature” as a concept (Stengers 2015, 
Latour 2017). Stengers also relies on science fiction to question objective science and its regime of knowledge 
production and understanding (2015). Thom Van Dooren’s Flight Ways engages in “lively storytelling” about the 
flight ways of birds with the intention of “storying” the world and intervening “into existing patterns of living and 
dying in an effort to work toward better worlds” (2014). And Anna Tsing’s The Mushroom at the End of the World 
is an ethnography of crisis told through, with, and from the perspective of matsutake mushrooms (2015). Each of 
these influence how this project incorporates storytelling and word-play into the methodology and writing, as well as 
influencing how the practice of storytelling and the power of narrative operate politically in discourse.  
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land and labor, the expectation of constant growth, the aggrandizement of consumer culture, and 
the devaluation of nonhuman being and of human labor as resources for exploitation in the name 
of profit) push on planetary limits and influence the cultural values and institutions which make 
planetary crisis so hard to fight against. They are also both immediately relevant to the political 
situation of the United States, which is the geopolitical location this analysis is focused on.  
 Neoliberalism [further theorized in Chapter 3] is an ideology rooted in the idea that an 
individual’s ultimate freedom is realized through an unfettered (laissez faire) market economy. 
Essentially, the market economy is held up as a system of valuation and social organization 
which orders what neoliberal patriarch, Milton Friedman (1962), described as the typical state of 
humankind: “tyranny, servitude, and misery”. State governance is considered a threat to freedom, 
and therefore must be cut back to the barebones of enforcing national order and the functioning 
of the economy (Friedman 1962). Classic neoliberal policy counsel includes privatization of all 
state operations, deregulation of markets, and cuts to social spending. It can be understood as an 
interpretation of “pure” liberal capitalism. Neoliberalism appears frequently in this project not 
only as a force structuring global power relationships, but also as a major influence (constant, 
albeit relatively invisibly) in American crisis culture.  
When neoliberalism began to be spread across the world (mostly in the 1980’s - on, but 
starting in the late 70’s), it did not build international power relations from the ground up. 
Rather, it further entrenched global power relationships that already existed (and were already 
benefiting the ruling class of America) as a consequence of imperial and colonization. Actors 
like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) facilitated this (Harvey 2007). In addition, the logics of difference used to justify 
and organize colonial (and imperial) projects (like the organizing grammar of race) continue to 
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operate and are entangled with the conditions of crisis. Anibal Quijano and Walter Mignolo’s 
conceptualization of the coloniality or colonial matrix of power model the relationship between 
economy, authority, gender and sexuality, subjectivity, and knowledge determined by 
positionality to a white supremacist, cisheteronormative standard body (Mignolo 2011, Lugones 
2010). It is along the lines of the coloniality of power that “othering” and dehumanization occur, 
meaning that the able white cisheteronormative body is the standard (or Self) and everyone that 
deviates from that standard is a lesser Other. Often the processing of Othering entails 
dispossession or dehumanization of the other, which has historically been used as justification 
for projects of brutality and exploitation (like slavery, mass incarceration for profit, and 
eugenics). These logics of difference continue to thrive and they work throughout both neoliberal 
globalization and discourses of planetary crisis.  
 For example, one of the most eminent (and problematic) stories concerning planetary 
crisis is the “the Population Bomb” or simply “overpopulation.” Sometimes the Population 
Bomb or overpopulation are presented either as direct drivers or major forces in forming 
planetary scale crisis. However, not only does the idea of the “population bomb” ignore the 
actual drivers of poverty or scarcity (particularly inequitable distribution of resources), it taps 
into a neo-Malthusian narrative of an imaginary crowded planet full of desperate, impoverished, 
and violent people (Hartmann 1995). The coloniality of power explains why the blame and fear 
of the population bomb is shunted onto poor black and brown people (particularly black and 
brown women) rather than wealthy over-consumers. And as a result, eugenics, sterilization 
projects, and the mass incarceration of migrants occur, justified by the myth of scarcity and the 
vilification of “others” through the coloniality of power.  
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The Crisis in Crisis and Existential Exceptionalism 
Joseph Masco is one scholar who addresses crisis-based discourse specifically. In “The 
Crisis in Crisis,” Masco (2017) conjures images of media cultures soaked in “crisis,” reporting 
crises from mega-storms to oil spills to police brutality. Masco suggested that in the US, there is 
a “crisis in crisis,” in which the term (or “affect generating idiom”) is diminished in its affective 
and discursive power to mobilize reaction because of “narrative saturation, overuse, and a lack of 
well-articulated positive futurities to balance stories of end-times,” (2017: 65). For Masco, the 
overwhelming nature of crisis in crisis is a part of a changing political sphere and language, as 
the neoliberal governance and imperial activity of the United States re-writes or breaks the 
“social contract” and leaves behind languages for collective social improvement (or even just 
survival) in favor of individualism. This is a limitation of “political horizons,”which limits the 
ability for collective imaginations of other politics (Masco 2017: 66). Masco goes so far as to say 
that “crisis talk today seeks to stabilize an institution, practice, or reality rather than interrogate 
the historical conditions of possibility for that endangerment to occur,” (2017: 73). Theorizing 
planetary crisis with the crisis in crisis in mind entails attention, not only to the political 
limitation of collective imaginaries, but also to the systems and norms protected by such 
limitations.  
Masco’s conclusion, that “the crisis in crisis” demands an increased commitment to the 
generation of positive futurities and the rehabilitation of collective “world-making” powers (like 
imagination) (2017: 74), resonates with other scholars. Among these, literary critic Amitav 
Ghosh argues in The Great Derangement (2016) that planetary crisis is also a “crisis” of culture 
and collective imagination (15). Collective imaginaries can be understood as collaborative, co-
produced capacities to envision new ways of thinking, being, and acting. Ghosh suggests that it 
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is the role of storytelling to help push collective imagination to reconceptualize human 
positionality in the planetary ecosystem as a response to planetary crisis. “The Great 
Derangement” is the state in which collective imaginaries fail to do this reconceptualization, and 
are therefore limited in their scope of reaction to crisis (Ghosh 2016). While Ghosh is primarily 
concerned with fiction novels, in this project I identify numerous modes of storytelling, from 
films to memes to trainings provided by advocacy groups like The Climate Mobilization.5  
Another term which is important to thinking with planetary crisis discourse is existential 
exceptionalism, and idea very similar to the crisis in crisis. Existential exceptionalism is a term 
used by climate writer Mary Annaise Heglar to describe the (false) sense of novelty that the 
environmental movement ascribes to the existential threat of contemporary planetary-scale crisis 
(particularly climate change) (2019). This sense of exceptionalism is false in the sense that there 
have already been many existential threats levied against the marginalized and exploited of the 
global system. Heglar’s example is being Black in America, particularly in the Jim Crow South 
(2019). Many of us concerned with planetary-scale crisis wonder if it’s responsible or worth 
having children in the face of utter uncertainty and ecological instability. What would their 
future be like, if ours is already so tumultuous? Heglar, however, points out that “Black people 
of the not-too-distant past trembled for every baby born into that world. Sound familiar?” (2019).  
This doesn’t mean that the fear of having children in an age of planetary crisis is invalid, but it 
does point to the ongoing nature of crisis, existential threat, and uncertainty. Existential 
                                                
5 One example of the types of discursive differences that I attempt to be attuned to can be seen in The Guardian’s 
2019 changes to its journalistic style guide. “Climate emergency” or “climate crisis” are now the only terms used for 
“climate change,” and “climate science denier” takes the place of “climate sceptic.”(Zeldin-O’Neill, 2019). These 
decisions about terminology are not neutral; there is much at stake. The shift from climate change to emergency and 
crisis is meant to emphasize the temporal immediacy and the seriousness of the issue. The shift from climate sceptic 
to climate science denier is intended to invalidate the arguments of denialists who claim that their position is 
rationally justified by “scepticism” rather than blatant disregard for scientific consensus. Thus, each of these changes 
includes a shift in political affect, orientation, imagination, and, at least arguably, outcome.  
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exceptionalism (whether it intends to or not) buys into a kind of historical amnesia which forgets 
histories of planetary crisis which were had in the past (such as the threat of nuclear war) and the 
contextual roots of planetary crisis in systems of power which have already (and continually) 
propagated projects of mass elimination and existential threat.  
 
A World Where Many Worlds Fit 
In Julie Cruikshank’s 2006 ethnography Do Glaciers Listen?, Cruikshank emphasizes 
that to her interlocutors, indigenous communities in the Yukon, glaciers have voices and agency 
in a way that a positivistic, scientific understanding would reject. And as Cruikshank lays out, 
colonial encounters and hegemonic power systems create a politics of knowledge which de-
legitimize “local” knowledges of crisis. Marginalization and erasure of knowledges othered from 
Western epistemes is part and parcel of the hegemonic power relationships which were 
entrenched globally through European colonization and imperialism (Sousa Santos et al 2008, 
Spivak 1988). Not only does this marginalization of knowledges have an impact on the 
formation and operation of collective imaginaries in response to planetary crisis, these power 
systematics (like the coloniality of power) are the same ones which have orchestrated planetary 
crisis and the conditions of vulnerability which position some humans to experience far worse 
and more immediate impacts of planetary crisis. 
However, there are many who point out that there are important lessons to be learned 
from sites of colonial difference created by the colonial matrix of power. Frameworks such as 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s “Epistemologies of the South” which center marginalized 
epistemes also take on an ontological power, in that epistemological diversity allows for the 
existence of many worlds (Escobar 2015). Anthropologist Arturo Escobar suggests that planetary 
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crisis is largely a crisis of the world figured by “Euro-modernity” and that actually thinking new 
thoughts (as many scholars of crisis are calling for) requires moving away from “the epistemic 
space of Western social theory and into the epistemic configurations associated with the multiple 
relational ontologies of worlds in struggle,” (2015). These politics are said to be a part of the 
pursuit of a “pluriverse” (as opposed to a uni-verse) in which many worlds fit, as the Zapatistas 
suggest (Escobar 2015). Although this project is primarily concerned with discourses which 
operate in a white Euro-American episteme, I bring border thinking and pluriversal politics to the 
conversation here briefly in order to highlight that the formation of collective imaginaries and 
alternative politics to globalized capitalism is actively occurring at points and perspectives de-
valued and marginalized by the coloniality of power and knowledge. My contribution is to begin 
to unravel discourses of crisis which hold onto that coloniality.  
 
 
Methods and Approach 
This project is not about finding the “best way” to discuss planetary crisis, nor does it 
provide an all-encompassing survey of the stories told about planetary crisis. Instead my 
approach is exploratory, emergent, and experimental. By exploratory I mean that I thought with 
and wrote about that which I encountered. I cannot make claims, therefore, that my sampling is 
representative or even sufficiently thorough. I do not quantify my results. But I do engage with 
stories that travel as, in many cases, the stories found me. I share stories (in the forms of protest 
marches and political campaigns, Hollywood films and science fiction, academic treatises and 
preparation guides, conservation ethics and viral memes) as well as in the form of my own 
experiences. Thus the thesis is also, in part, experiential auto-ethnography - my own contribution 
to the collective imaginary.  So what I provide here is a preliminary analysis, an emblematic few 
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strands from a larger web of stories, described and analyzed in detail. The exploratory and 
emergent nature was only amplified by the development of a global pandemic half-way through 
the semester, which has both made the writing process far harder, but also made the project more 
immediately relevant than ever.6 COVID-19 and the impacts of physical distancing haunt, 
inform, and limit this project. 
 
The Stories I Gathered and Encountered 
I used a sort of snow-ball sampling to locate the stories I present in these chapters. By 
snowball sampling, I mean opportunistically “following the rabbit,” letting one source lead me to 
the next and to eventually (dis)orienting me in an endless sea of discursive objects and themes. 
For example, I came across The Climate Mobilization “organizer toolkit” (featured in Chapter 
Two), after ClimAct sent two of our members to a “Climate Emergency” training they organized. 
That toolkit then led me to their website, where I found a number of other sources (like 
“Emergency Mode”).  
I also relied on my own experiences. My pursuit of an undergraduate degree in 
“sustainable development” and my grassroots organizing inform this thesis, but so too do my day 
to day conversations about planetary crisis. I treat each as field sites where artifacts and themes 
emerged. In that sense, I am indebted to the people around me - like my friend Willy, who 
provides the framework for the story that follows this introduction. Or my co-organizer (and 
instructor), Dr. Susan Reed, who introduced me to Bendell’s Deep Adaptation (featured in 
                                                
6  I certainly wasn’t expecting it, but in a dark way it was almost sickly convenient, like a new example of planetary 
crisis had been served up to me on a platter, itching to be written about. But it’s still so fresh, still unfolding. And it 
has definitely made this already overly ambitious project harder. By the time that this project is at its end point, 
things will still be uncertain. And the losses are so great, and so fresh that I thought it best to keep COVID-19 out of 
the spotlight. But it’s still there, throughout this project, as I write and edit, I am living in this planetary crisis, “we” 
are all living in the crisis (because it is planetary), though the experiences of each person are different. 
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Chapter 3) over a working Tex-Mex dinner one night as we planned an energy justice summit. In 
some cases, these connections brought me to new ideas and examples. And in other cases, 
conversations, experiences, and stories recounted to me (whether online or in person) have 
become integral sights for auto-ethnographic reflection (discussed more below). I must also 
mention that while the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the flow of the project, it 
was always my intent that many of my materials of analysis come from digital spaces, where the 
lines of authorship are often blurred. This is intended to provide further space for insight into 
how discourses of planetary crisis are co-produced and contribute to collective imaginaries. 
Due to the disparate origin and sources of my materials, I have tried to be very clear 
throughout about how I encountered my sources. Especially because in some sense, this project 
and my participation is part of the discourse, and the digital spaces which I draw much of my 
work from are also spaces where there are many authors. Sometimes the authors are 
unidentifiable.  
 
My Approach to Analysis 
I approached the research as a general inquiry into planetary crisis discourse, and I tried 
to let the analytical frameworks and themes that I came to use develop from the stories and 
materials I encountered and collected. The themes and frameworks were also influenced by some 
a priori interests, ideas I had spent the past four years working with and through, about 
coloniality and decoloniality, systems thinking, and neoliberal globalization. 
To illustrate the process: I first identified themes, key frameworks, and even crisis-related 
phrases that I felt were relevant and wrote them on notecards. This allowed me to visually map 
and make connections between concepts that I had never thought to put together before. There 
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were a lot of notecards. They range from “Migration” to “The Rapture” to “Settler Moves to 
Innocence” to one that just said “Live Fast, Die Young, Bad Girls Do It Well.” I had “Preppers,” 
and “Doomers” and “Boomers.” Suffice to say that not everything on the cards made it into the 
project (explicitly, anyway). I grouped, sorted, and stacked these, and eventually I wrote new 
ones and posted them on my wall.7(See Images 1.3. and 1.4.) 
By working and reworking relations between the cards, I identified a collection of 
interrelated themes that became my organizing framework and key chapters for the thesis: 
emergency, apocalypse, and extinction. These terms were not only recurrent and interrelated, 
they were themselves lively discourses of social and ecological change, of threat and 
opportunities, and the relationship between individuals and collectives. 
The more experimental part of the thesis is this: I took some of my own day to day 
encounters with planetary crisis storytelling and turned them into very short stories. Throughout 
the thesis these act as interruptions and interludes distinct from, but still related to the formal 
chapters. These help ground the analysis in the present and the daily presence of crisis and they 
reveal the more pedestrian workings of collective imaginaries. They also leave open space for 
speculation on the tensions between academic writing (which is a form of storytelling in its own 
                                                
7 When this is over I’ll probably burn them. 
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right) and my active storytelling in the shared struggle to conceive of planetary crisis amidst the 
collisions of the existential in with the mundane of the everyday. 
 
Essentially, I have attempted to take disparate but thematically related things and  
juxtapose them to see what emerges. My findings and arguments were derived this way. It might 
not be the most orthodox of methods, but I believe that it has served its purpose in pursuing the 
goals and questions. And there is also an added bonus of troubling what is legitimized as “real 
knowledge production” in academic settings, which is often rooted in references to a disciplinary  
 
 
 
 
canon and conducted through positivistic research methods. I have left some of those  
frameworks behind as a part of the normalcy that I am attempting to problematize throughout 
this project.  
 
Images 1.3 and 1.4.  
Photos Provided by Author 
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Chapter Overview  
 In the second chapter, I examine the role of “emergency” as a concept in planetary crisis 
discourse primarily through the lens of “Climate Emergency.” Climate Emergency is a 
politically active term that seeks to leverage the World War II mobilization as a precedent to 
appeal to the state to mobilize against climate change (as if it were equivalent to a war). I 
problematize this appeal primarily through investigation of the states of legal suspension / 
exception which states of emergency open up. I argue that to center the term emergency in 
discourses of crisis (especially in United States-based activism) is an appeal to “normal” systems 
which opens up a state of exception for “the greater good”. In some respects, therefore, declaring 
a climate change emergency can reorient states to take the calls of scientists and society 
seriously. Yet the means to achieve this ends rest, too often, on sacrifices that can easily be 
imposed on vulnerable populations rather than being taken on collectively or by the wealthy.  
In the second chapter, I think with the concept of “apocalypse” as an orientation towards 
crisis which assumes the obliteration of the social “normal” that precedes it. I ask how 
apocalypse is produced and reproduced in apocalyptic blockbuster films, and how that formation 
of apocalypse contributes to neoliberal “normalcy,” disaster capitalism and narratives of “white 
affect.” I then think with the “prepper” as an attitude towards apocalypse that manifests the 
individualization of security. In other words, the lack of social support systems and the 
neoliberalization of the mind has prompted people to internalize the need to prepare for 
apocalypse not as a society but as individuals or households.These and other discourses of 
“apocalypse” are sites where people produce, reproduce, and negotiate shared conceptions of 
what apocalypse means, when exactly the apocalypse is going to happen (or if it’s already 
happening), what it will look like (and how we will dress for it) as well as how to prepare for it. 
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The question, I argue, that needs to follow: Is the apocalypse in question an emergent threat to 
American normalcy, or is it the escalation of that normalcy? 
In the third chapter, I take up “extinction” in planetary crisis discourse as a term 
entangled with the threat of Mass Extinction. I consider the role of extinction in discourses of 
environmentalism, and in turn what effect environmentalism as a movement has on collective 
conceptions of planetary crisis. I use Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang’s theorization of “settler 
moves to innocence” to characterize the role of “wilderness” (and extinction) in American 
environmentalism. I then pay attention to the relationship between “charismatic species’ and 
mass extinction, after which I will argue that both the centering of charismatic species and settler 
environmentalist moves to innocence are protecting settler normalcy and futurity. And finally, I 
think with the Doomer as an orientation towards planetary crisis that assumes the inevitability of 
extinction. I show that Doomer-ism is both another embodiment of existential exceptionalism, 
but also a concept by which lively (and arguably necessary) conversations about collective 
threat, loss, and death are being catalyzed.  
In conclusion, I argue that discourses of planetary crisis have the power to shape 
collective imaginaries, which in turn orient human action towards crisis. I argue that 
existential exceptionalism, which removes planetary crisis from its entangled context with 
legacies of neoliberal globalization and other systems of exploitation, limits the capacity of 
collective imaginaries to fight the actual causes of planetary crisis.  
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INTERLUDE I | “FROGS IN A POT” 
 
Before COVID-19 appeared on the horizon, I had a part-time job working in a coffee 
house that has been in this town for several decades. Between the hours I spent writing for my 
professors and the hours I am paid to make coffee or bake pastries, I was in the shop a lot, and I 
have come to know many of the other people who also spend a lot of their time there. Our 
regulars. 
One of these is a fellow named Willy.8 Willy is tall, in his 40’s, and loves to read history 
books. He works nights at the infamous on-campus gas station. Leading up to the COVID-19 
outbreak, he spent a majority of his days in the coffee shop and at the community cafe around the 
corner, as he is homeless. Willy would often have rich conversations on the shop smoking stoop 
(which is actually just the back steps of an Antique Mall). One particularly dreary day I went out 
to the stoop after clocking out from a shift to drink my free beer with Willy, who was asking me 
about this project. I explained to him that I was writing about planetary crisis stories and their 
political implications.  
He nodded and said that sometimes he felt like we were all “frogs in a pot.” I laughed and 
agreed. The tale goes, that if you put a frog into a pot of boiling water, it will jump out, but if you 
put a frog in a pot of still water and heat it slowly to a boil that the frog will never know until it’s 
too late. He said, some of the frogs are wise now to what’s happening, but they can’t convince 
the other frogs that it’s worth doing something about. They’re still stuck in the pot.  
They are eased into death, accepting the increasing heat as normalcy. 
 
 
 
                                                
8 This is a pseudonym. 
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CHAPTER TWO | EMERGENCY 
 
When I heard my crewmate’s deep, booming voice yell FIRE! the first time, I thought 
that he was joking. I was standing, shocked for a second, holding a 4 pound “single-jack” sledge 
hammer in my right hand. My trail crew and I were crushing rocks and building stone stairs in 
the baking summer Southern Californian sun.9 We were several miles from our car, surrounded 
by brittle, dehydrated scrub. I thought to myself that it wasn’t a very damn funny place to be 
joking about fire.  
 Before my mind caught up to the reality of fire, my body was being shoved down the trail 
by my supervisor. I tripped over the rock stairs that we had already completed. I dropped the 
single-jack and tripped on that too. And then I saw it - the fire, burning in the middle of the dry 
creek bed, growing and spreading in the coarse grass and bushes. The husk of a dead agave plant 
caught, and then we ran. All there was to do was run. We ran until our legs couldn’t take it 
anymore, until my friend chucked in the scrub, her face as red as the flame. She was asthmatic. 
We could see the smoke clouds mushrooming in the sky, and I was repeatedly trying to dial the 
National Forest Dispatch, my calls dropped over and over again. I vaguely remember yelling, 
and the faint sound of our bluetooth speaker still playing the workplace tunes - Lynyrd 
Skynyrd’s “Simple Man.” I remember being thirsty. I had dropped two of my water bottles; they 
were too heavy, they had to be sacrificed. 
 When wildland fires break out on public land, the standard procedure includes 
investigation into the cause. When the Angeles National Forest guys came to question us, they  
                                                
9 I was with American Conservation Experience (ACE) based out of Dulzura, CA.  
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did it in one on one interviews, asking us questions like “Was anyone angry that day?” “Are 
there smokers on your crew?” “Which way was the wind blowing?” These were relevant 
questions. After all, if the wind had been blowing a different way that day this might be a 
different story. Nonetheless, I fixated on the ugly wallpaper in the room and told them the truth – 
that we weren’t allowed to smoke on project and, that at the time, I had been too preoccupied 
with other thoughts (like what it might be like to die in a fire) to think about which way the wind 
was blowing. 
They understood. And then they told me that for the forest service, this fire had actually 
served a somewhat productive purpose - it was burning a canyon that hadn’t burned in decades 
and clearing out brush before an even larger fire could threaten the nearby town. It was contained 
and controlled with little incident. But to us, the fire had felt life-threatening. To the nearby 
residents, who evacuated themselves, their precious belongings, and their large animals, it was 
an emergency. But from another angle, our single fire (the Stone Fire) did not stand alone in the 
minds of many. Rather, it was a small part of a longer, brutal “fire season”. The 2018 Californian 
Images 1.1 and 1.2.  
Image 1.1 is a photo taken by author of path into trail work site 
Image 1.2 “Stone Fire” is from the Santa Clarita Valley Signal  
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fire season was (to this date) one of the most deadly and destructive seasons on record. And that 
single season is also part of a broader trend of change, in which fires burn hotter, larger, and 
more unpredictably.10  
 
“Emergency” refers to a dramatic shift in state or status, from normalcy into extra-
ordinary conditions, necessitating immediate remedy to prevent tragic losses. Emergencies are 
exceptional. And yet, whether they are “natural” disasters (landslides, floods, fires), tragic 
accidents (car crashes, workplace injuries, falls), or acts of violence (terrorist attacks, wars), they 
happen every day. As in the story of the Stone Fire incident, perceiving “emergency” depends on 
the scale and magnitude of the event, circumstance, or relationship and on one’s position (and 
positionality) in relation to the event. 
 In this chapter, I focus my analysis of discourses of planetary crisis on recent 
mobilization around “Climate Emergency.” I take my first step into (Climate) Emergency 
discourse with an analysis of an “organizer’s toolkit” for the advancement of climate emergency 
campaigns put out by the grassroots advocacy organization, The Climate Mobilization. I then 
characterize the very active tension between the pursuit of “climate emergency” and the history 
and potential of injustice perpetrated by the state in times of emergency-related legal suspension.  
Climate-concerned organizers, advocates, and activists use emergency terminology  
strategically, to make an appeal to their governments to classify anthropogenic climate change as 
an emergency. Such a move would theoretically reify the threat of climate change in the 
                                                
10 I grew up in the East Tennessee valley, a very green area with lots of water, where the topography, climate, and 
ecology largely protected my life from dramatic natural disasters. I had never seen a wildfire in person before this 
(although my new Californian friends were accustomed to seeing them on the side of the road at times), and I was 
under the (false) impression for a long time that wildfires just didn’t happen like that in the Appalachian Mountains. 
However, in 2016, the Great Smoky Mountains Wildfire complex burned through places and landscapes that I 
cherished and claimed the lives of 14. It was the deadliest fire event in the eastern US since 1947. While the 
emblematic location for fire tragedies in the US is California, changes are occurring across the globe.  
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language of the state, and would set a precedent for taking serious steps to address it. In today’s 
context, where the executive leader of the US has refused to act (and instead denied climate 
change and doubled down on measures to increase global warming, ramped up high emissions 
economy), organizers have also targeted city and state governments with their campaigns. 
However, there are real concerns around the use of the term - in particular, the (precedented) 
potential for the US government to exploit emergency powers to advance other agendas, 
including those involving racism and militarization. 
  In the United States, those advocating for a state of “Climate Emergency” grasp at the 
precedent set by the large-scale mobilization and redirection of US resources and labor force 
during World War II. In that case, the state took a powerful role in redirecting industrial activity 
towards military needs, distributing resources and otherwise influencing the daily lives of 
everyday Americans. This is because the nation was in a recognized state of emergency (and 
therefore in a state of political exception) post-Pearl Harbor. War time efforts hinged on 
enormous sacrifices, some of them generative, collective efforts, others aberrant human rights 
violations. If the WWII mobilization is the same level of commitment and pace of action that 
Climate Emergency campaigns seek (both within the United States and in other places), there is 
reason for hesitation. I argue that the normalization or necessity of “sacrifices” in emergency 
management contributes to that active tension, in which “Climate Emergency” is both extremely 
important and extremely dangerous.  
 
Sacrifice, Suspension, and State Responsibility 
Emergency brings up important questions about state responsibility and important 
implications about the relationship between states and citizens. This is certainly the case in a 
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context of US neoliberalism, characterized by the role back of public services, including 
emergency response (Gotham 2012). The declaration of a “state of emergency” in response to a 
crisis allows state authorities to expand the actions that they can take legitimately and, in some 
cases, to make exceptions to the law. Sundberg (2015) refers to this as “legal suspension,” or a 
“state of exception” (Agamben 2005) in which the state can act how it wants with relative 
impunity in the name of the greater good. In theory, that expansion of power is “necessary” to 
make the emergency response most effective. However, there have been a number of cases in the 
United States in which a declared “state of emergency” has been used to justify actions unlimited 
to the scope of the “emergency” (if there is one at all) - for instance, in the case of the “crisis at 
the border” being declared an emergency by Donald Trump (Holden 2019), a topic I return to at 
the end of the chapter.11 
Emergency management is geared towards the best possible outcome of the situation, 
with the least losses.12 In emergency management (especially with an emergency with mass 
casualties, like a war), who or what is helped in what order is determined by criteria like triage - 
which assumes that there will be a certain amount of sacrifice necessary to achieve the best 
outcome possible. In a state of legal suspension, the state has an increased ability to determine 
what sacrifices are “necessary” for the greater good.  
Princen (2010) characterizes sacrifices as positive or negative according to the 
positionality and power of the actors making sacrifices (positive) or being sacrificed (negative). 
Positive sacrifices, like parenthood, are taken on willingly with the assumption that sacrifice is 
implicit in the fulfillment of the role. Parenting involves enormous trade-offs in terms of 
                                                
11 It’s also worth pointing out here that some “emergency relief” delivered by the United States, such as the 
response following Hurricane Katrina, is also both dangerous and inadequate.  
12 Of course, in the US, individuals and groups with power can influence the emergency management process if 
their interests conflict with the interests of the collective greater good.  
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commitments of time, energy, finances and even health, yet parents endure these costs as 
investments in the future (including their future). Negative sacrifice, on the other hand, is a 
sacrifice imposed, wherein individuals are sacrificed themselves for the good of a future that is 
not accountable to, and indeed, may not include them. Negative sacrifices are not “part of the 
bargain” at least not for those being scarified; here Princen’s example is the coal miner who sells 
labor for a paycheck, but then also has their health sacrificed (2010).  
In the United States, the negative sacrifices have been made or forced upon those living 
on the margins of society. One example is the placement of toxic industries in the backyards of 
those who are systematically dispossessed from the means to resist, particularly BIPOC (Black, 
Indigenous, and persons of color) communities (Bullard 2010). These and other areas that are 
particularly contaminated for the “greater good” of industry are called “sacrifice zones” (Lerner 
2010, Maldonado 2019). In Princen’s words, this is institutionalized negative sacrifice. This 
pattern of unjust and imposed “sacrifice” is one of the reasons that appealing to the state for 
emergency management means risking further repetition of unequal patterns. On another hand, 
planetary crises like climate change tend to impact vulnerable communities first (who are now 
more prone to health problems because of the toxic industries right down the road), leaving 
climate inaction as another mode of injustice and of sacrifice in the service of upholding systems 
which contribute to planetary problems.13  
Given the gravity of these circumstances and the very real practices of sacrificing the 
vulnerable, “Climate Emergency” has emerged as a site of tension between the injustice of 
climate inaction and the risks of “legal suspension” in the United States. I will argue that to 
center the term emergency in discourses of crisis (especially in US-based activism) is an appeal 
                                                
13 Geographic location and climate are also factors which influence vulnerability in this sense.  
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to “normal” systems which opens up a state of exception for “the greater good”. In some 
respects, therefore, declaring a climate change emergency can re-orient states to take the calls of 
scientists and society seriously. Yet the means to achieve this ends rest, too often, on sacrifices 
that can be easily imposed on vulnerable populations rather than being taken on collectively or 
by the wealthy. While the wealthy might be convinced to make minor lifestyle changes (like 
metal straws, or going vegan), the nature of sacrifices suffered by the most vulnerable are often 
sacrifices of well-being, health, and livelihood.  
 
Mobilizing From Below 
The Climate Mobilization is a non-profit think tank and advocacy group that provides 
groups of all kinds across the US with the tools to run Climate Emergency campaigns. On 
Thursday January 9th of 2020, I wrote to The Climate Mobilization to explore what running a 
Climate Emergency campaign entailed. The following day, I received the “Organizer Toolkit” 
from The Climate Mobilization in an email. The Toolkit was a Google Doc entitled “Guide to 
Starting a Climate Emergency Campaign.” It is littered with embedded links to further Google 
Docs, a bit like a maze. There are no named authors on the document, but in other ways, the 
document felt alive. In the top right corner of the Google Document window, colorful animal 
icons signify the simultaneous presence of anonymous readers in the same online space. I 
wondered how many different places and burgeoning campaigns for change those people 
represented. The embedded links inform the reader about the history of climate emergency, how 
to start laying out a campaign, and how to network with and train others. There are also 
templates and case studies and practices, even training curricula. The latter includes “Reaching 
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Out to Partner Organization,” “Guide to Putting On a Town Hall,” and a “Commitment Card” 
template (“a tool for asking people to join your campaign”) (“Guide to Starting…” 2019).  
The Climate Mobilization suggests that the core of such a campaign should be a steering 
committee of 3-5 people, around which many working groups revolve. The working groups 
divide up the tasks of contacting local representatives; conducting outreach; organizing trainings, 
town halls, and assemblies; planning actions; and educating voters. Too many people to work 
effectively in a small group? Split up into even smaller working groups and encourage folks to 
start neighborhood climate emergency campaigns to educate and recruit their neighbors. The 
Mobilization logic seems to follow that every time the story of Climate Emergency is told, the 
window for new involvement opens wider. The more people are “missionized” and brought into 
the know now, the easier and more equitable a transition to national mobilization would be. 
In the section of the Tool Kit marked “The Change We Can Create,” the unnamed 
authors describe their reasoning. The end goal of a Climate Emergency campaign is to move the 
federal government to decisive action. According to The Climate Mobilization, over 1,350 
governments of varying scales (national, provincial, municipal, rural) in 26 countries have 
declared a state of Climate Emergency. The US is not one of the 26, but the concept has been 
gaining traction in cities, counties, and states, which are able to independently declare 
themselves in a state of Climate Emergency. Plenty of cities in the US have done so - Hoboken, 
NJ was the first, and is followed by more (including New York, Chicago, San Diego, San 
Francisco, Albuquerque, Austin, Flagstaff, Miami, Minneapolis, and Asheville) (The Climate 
Mobilization, 2020). Los Angeles skipped right over the emergency declaration and jumped 
straight to creating a city office and city commission to design and implement a climate 
mobilization plan (The Climate Mobilization, 2019). 
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The Climate Mobilization is also careful to remind organizers of other types of slippage 
between national, state, and city/county levels of governance. In other words, it’s not only about 
organizing from below to influence the federal government. In some cases, like federally 
mandated minimum wage laws and the Affordable Care Act, states and cities have ignored what 
has been mandated to them from above (“Guide to Starting… 2019). To this end, Climate 
Mobilization perceives the local/state levels of governance as strategic places to organize, not 
only for the crucial community connections that emerge, but also because this type of 
organization from below lays the groundwork for easy local transitions into what they hope will 
be passed at the federal level.  
 
States of Emergency and Positive Citizen Sacrifice 
Climate Mobilization works towards the “use of World War II-type policy instruments to 
transform the economy on an emergency basis” (The Climate Mobilization 2020). The phrase 
“WWII-level mobilization” emerges as a constant refrain throughout the maze of documents as 
the ultimate precedent and example of what is being sought by “Climate Emergency.” This 
aligns climate change (and planetary crisis generally) with other (perceived) threats to national 
security. World War II is the strategic and legal baseline for Climate Emergency campaigns, not 
only in convincing government officials, but also in spreading awareness to the public.  
The WWII mobilization is even integrated into Climate Mobilization visuals. For 
example, one of the co-founders, Ezra Silk, published a Climate Mobilization “Victory Plan,” 
which draws from WWII programs like “victory gardens” and “victory taxes.” The cover of this 
report (see Image 2.1) is deliberately reminiscent of the iconic “Raising the Flag at Iwo Jima” 
photo, the American flag replaced by a wind turbine. The same image backgrounds the home 
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page of their website. The optics evoke a sense of collective patriotism in extraordinary times of 
need. It is a call, not only for the state to have a more pro-active role in climate action, but also 
for citizens to rally around national identity and make sacrifices for “the war effort.” 
Salamon goes on to celebrate the personal sacrifices of Americans of the 40’s, who 
fought in the war and took factory jobs, invested in war bonds, and ate rations. She says that the 
country was united in a spirit of unity, sacrifice, and common purpose. In facilitating a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nationwide “emergency mode,” the state is promoting a collective culture in which the 
participants see themselves and their actions as part of a whole, which feels rarely promoted by  
the state post-neoliberal reform. This collective culture is how the state is able to encourage 
citizens to make personal lifestyle sacrifices for the greater good, or the war effort. For example,  
the aforementioned Victory Gardens were household gardens encouraged by the government  
Image 2.1 “TCM Victory Plan.”  
theclimatemobilization.org  
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during the war, which required families to sacrifice some of their time, but attempted to locate 
more food directly with households to increase national resilience. In the current American 
political climate, this and other measures would be unthinkably “progressive” from some 
perspectives, and alarmingly socialist from other perspectives. This is especially true of the 
“Victory Tax,” which taxed the highest earners 88% in 1942 and 94% in 1944 (Salamon, 
2016).14 In the state of emergency, these are normalized as positive sacrifices (using Princen’s 
typology), in which the sacrifices being made are the just and patriotic duty of willing citizens. 
However, during the World War II mobilization there were also instances of large-scale negative 
sacrifice which was imposed on vulnerable groups in the United States as a means of national 
security. This legacy of institutional negative sacrifice comes along with the invocation of the 
WWII mobilization alongside emergency just as the positive collective sacrifices do.  
 
States of Exception and Negative Sacrifice 
WWII mobilization efforts aimed to bolster American military power abroad and to 
increase national security back home. Measures like rationing and the push for individual self-
sufficiency and thriftiness (à la “Victory Gardens), for instance, were designed to increase 
political and social resilience of “the Home Front” during war time. Such sacrifices were 
justified as patriotic and ultimately empowering, for the nation and for the citizenry. Other 
efforts like the Manhattan Project and the internment of Japanese citizens and immigrants (both 
discussed below in more detail) also hinged on citizen sacrifice, but in these contexts roles and 
directionality of the sacrifices being made and the positionality of those being scarified in 
relation to the state were far different. 
                                                
14 This seems important to note in an era of American history in which the wealth gap cannot be 
contained on a visible graph without a break in scale... 
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Both Japanese internment and the Manhattan project operated in the grey area of 
“suspended legality” opened up by the declaration of war. While both projects were tentatively 
legal (through eminent domain and executive acts), they were highly contested by the parties 
being sacrificed. The state nonetheless justified these in the interest of the “greater good.” As 
both of these projects had serious consequences for human rights and justice, they are significant 
points from which to begin identifying and analyzing the risks of declaring climate emergency 
and the gravity of the political power embedded in the process. 
The Manhattan Project was a research and development project backed by the United 
States (and allies, Canada and the United Kingdom) that aimed to complete nuclear weapons 
before opponents like Germany could do so. Led by Army Corps of Engineers Major General 
Leslie R. Groves, the project involved research into atomic science, purchase of large amounts of 
materials (like uranium) which had to be mined and refined, the construction of sites to build the 
weapons, and weapons testing (Galiffa 2019). Such was the scale of the project that the 
government built entire secret cities (like Oak Ridge, TN) to house workers and their families, 
who were required to keep silent about the work that they were doing under threat of arrest. The 
government selected project sites (most notably Los Alamos, NM, Oak Ridge, and Hanford, 
WA) because of their relative isolation (Galiffa 2019). In both the Oak Ridge and Hanford sites, 
the government seized the land through eminent domain justified by war powers, displacing 
residents who had no way of refusing. At Oak Ridge (which is in Appalachian East Tennessee), 
the residents of the area at the time were largely poor white farmers. Among the displaced at 
Hanford (and affected in post-project contamination and clean-up) were the Confederated Tribes 
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and Bands of the Yakama Nation, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, 
the Nez Perce Tribe, and the Wanapum people (Phillips, 2020). 
The legacy of the Manhattan Project also reaches far beyond World War II. The nuclear 
age, which extended into the Cold War, demanded copious amounts of materials like uranium. 
The US government sourced uranium from the Navajo Nation, where Navajo miners were 
uninformed of the risks of radiation and given no protective equipment for themselves or their 
families. Intensive mining there resulted in serious health consequences for both miners and their 
families, as well as contamination of land and water (Masco, 2006). In addition, nuclear weapons 
were frequently tested in “remote” areas where nearby residents had to deal with the fall-out 
(literally). It occurred in the southwest US, and it occurred at Bikini Atoll, an island in the 
Marshall Islands, where residents were moved with the promise that they could return (Brown, 
2013). Promises aside, following testing, land was far too contaminated to support human life, 
and the residents were permanently displaced. In addition to the people, livelihoods, and 
territories sacrificed to construct the sites and the weapons, and to test, there are the enormous 
social and environmental costs and legacies to those places, sacrifice zones, detonated by nuclear 
war, like Hiroshima and Nagasaki.   
The legacy of the Manhattan Project also reaches far beyond World War II. The nuclear 
age, which extended into the Cold War, demanded copious amounts of materials like uranium. 
The US government sourced uranium from the Navajo Nation (as well as Laguna Pueblo land), 
where Navajo miners were uninformed of the risks of radiation and given no protective 
equipment for themselves or their families. Intensive mining there resulted in serious health 
consequences for both miners and their families, as well as contamination of land and water 
(Masco, 2006). In addition, nuclear weapons were frequently tested in “remote” areas where 
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nearby residents had to deal with the fall-out (literally). It occurred in the southwest US, and it 
occurred at Bikini Atoll, an island in the Marshall Islands, where residents were moved with the 
promise that they could return (Brown, 2013). Promises aside, following testing, land was far too 
contaminated to support human life, and the residents were permanently displaced. In addition to 
the people, livelihoods, and territories sacrificed to construct the sites and the weapons, and to 
test, there are the enormous social and environmental costs and legacies to those places, sacrifice 
zones, detonated by nuclear war, like Hiroshima and Nagasaki.   
While each situation is unique in important ways, both Japanese internment and the mass 
incarceration currently occurring at the Mexico-US border are examples of human rights 
violations that are authorized by states of legal suspension in response to a “crisis” that is highly 
racialized.15 For instance, according to Representative Blumenauer’s office, Blumenauer decided 
to draft the Climate Emergency resolution introduced in 2019 after President Donald Trump 
declared an emergency at the Mexico-US border, claiming that a border wall was critical 
infrastructure to protect the US from a “crisis” (Holden 2019). And state of emergency aside, the 
US-Mexico borderlands are routinely a site of legal suspension.  
Juanita Sundberg writes about this pattern in “The state of exception and the imperial 
way of life in the United States-Mexico borderlands,” which examines legal suspension that 
facilitates the construction of border wall/fencing infrastructure. Sundberg demonstrates that 
models of “the political” that operate within a system whose limits are set by the Constitution or 
other nation-state constructs are nearly impossible to productively struggle through. The work 
also unpacks the normalization of inequitable legal suspension in borderlands as part of imperial 
                                                
15 It is also important to note that mass incarceration of migrants, refugees, and immigrants by Immigrant and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE), (along with the instrumentality of the Border Patrol [CBP]) is not only a phenomenon 
entangled with US interventionism in Latin America, but also with climate change and other conditions of planetary 
crisis. 
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life-ways that are entrenched in the operational history of the United States. Therefore, in calling 
for the use of extra-judicial power in the service of climate action, Climate Emergency 
campaigners risk activating further imperial patterns of governance. 
This is especially critical in conversations about the borderlands and the mass 
incarceration occuring there, as planetary crises continue to amplify the conditions which 
motivate migration and border-crossings. As the language of crisis and emergency are repeatedly 
leveraged in general discourse as well as in policy, it is worth asking (instead of “What is the 
crisis?”) the question “Who is the crisis?” or “Who is being painted as the crisis?”  In the case of 
migration and asylum-seeking from Latin America to the United States across the Mexico-US 
border, refugees and migrants are portrayed as the crisis itself, rather than parties who are 
victims of the crisis. In the “world of scarce resources” mobilized in images of apocalypse and 
crisis, refugees and migrants are the “other” threatening the limited supplies of Americans. This 
sort of sentiment allows for the legal continuation of the dehumanization of migrants, refugees, 
and immigrants and their treatment in detention centers and other apparatus of the immigration 
machine. It is the grounds on which premature deaths go on without oversight or accountability. 
As non-US citizens, migrants and refugees are already vulnerable “others” in the eyes of the US 
legal system, but states of emergency or the appearance of emergency only complicates and 
exacerbates the situation.  
Legal suspension legitimized by a state of emergency also holds the potential to threaten 
other legally vulnerable parties. Among others, Indigenous Climate Change Studies scholar Kyle 
Whyte has voiced concerns about what handing more power over to the state might mean for 
Native self-determination and tribal and/or national sovereignty in North America (Whyte 2017). 
Crises like climate change (and other “environmental” degradations) already disproportionately 
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affect Indigenous populations and nations and therefore their rights to self-determination (Whyte 
2017). Whyte points out that changes in habitats and potential displacement could threaten the 
functionality of treaties, which are extremely difficult to be re-negotiated equitably because of 
the allocation of political power and authority. Processes of emergency management that might 
arise during a state of Climate Emergency may only further threaten already delicate balances of 
sovereignty and self-determination.  
The Climate Mobilization’s Tool Kit suggests to those running Climate Emergency 
campaigns that tribal governments ought to be contacted at the beginning of the process to 
ensure proper communication and to allow those governments to have a say in how the campaign 
proceeds, but it cannot be overlooked that appealing to the US federal government at all is to 
appeal to a settler colony with a storied history of eliminatory violence. Similar to Sundberg’s 
point that the imperial patterns are reinforced by regular legal suspension in the borderlands, 
legal suspension is a method by which the settler state has manipulated the rights and lives of 
indigenous people(s) for centuries, whether it be through blatant disregard of treaty or simply 
(but severely) inequitable law enforcement. In this sense, the state of exception created by a 
climate emergency declaration would have serious political implications for vulnerable parties, 
but it would also be a singular part of a larger picture of normalized legal suspension.  
Through these examples, it can be seen that the use of “emergency” as a strategic 
rhetorical turn based on the precedent of the WWII mobilization in discourses of planetary crisis 
(particularly in activism for climate action) not only risks justifying extrajudicial action of the 
state on dubious, racialized grounds, but also that frameworks which rely on the US nation-state 
as the key platform for climate-related work are limited in their understandings of what counts as 
political action and where power really lies. Emergency shapes the collective imaginary of 
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planetary crisis to be a phenomenon that can and should be primarily managed by “experts” from 
the top down, leaving ample room for the US to justify all sorts of projects that control “threats” 
to national security through negative sacrifices and incarceration, violence, and racialized logics.  
 
Legal Suspension as Normalcy 
When discussing states of exception and legal suspension, Sundberg also notes that 
despite the qualities of “exceptionalism,” the implementation of these states in the borderlands is 
actually normalized and everyday. This normalized state of sacrifice is said to activate imperial 
life-ways which have animated the United States since its inception as a settler colony (Sundberg 
2015). In addition, the normalization of imperial life-ways is built-up by the nationalized myth 
that “politics” and citizen engagement can only happen legitimately within the confines of the 
United States Constitution, which is by no means the actual terms and conditions of politicality. 
“Climate Emergency” risks reifying these boundaries, limiting the scope of collective 
imaginaries to understand and react to planetary crises appropriately.  
In 2019’s “Climate Emergency Politics is Dangerous,” human geographer Mike Hulme 
suggests that “...meeting the challenge of climate change for future human well-being demands a 
proliferation of diverse policy goals, the very opposite of what states of exception bring into 
being” (Hulme 2019). This resonates with the aforementioned sense that politicality limited to 
the confines of the American Constitution in turn limits the scope of reaction to crisis that might 
be appropriate. The entire concept of a “state of emergency,” of course, entails a break from 
normalcy into crisis and threat, which a Climate Emergency campaign then counters with a 
WWII Mobilization-type state-led rally, which might tend to conceptually (or even physically) 
limit options for resilience-building, survival, and flourishing that occur outside of the 
conceptual boundaries of the US. 
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Hulme and others like him are reminding readers that global health, biodiversity loss, 
desertification, challenges to marine fisheries, and other planetary crises are ongoing, and 
Climate Emergency mobilization as temporary solution could potentially threaten to keep them 
out of the conversation by focusing too much energy on issues that would mitigate only certain 
aspects of planetary crisis. Thus, Climate Emergency amounts to a reductive logic because 
climate change has been oversimplified in public discourse by its summation as “seductive” 
metrics like global temperature and carbon dioxide concentration. Accepting this would mean 
that we are in a: 
“quasi-permanent state of emergency; [which] also obscures much of what 
actually matters for human well-being and ecological integrity. Carbon metrics are 
only a proxy for global temperature, which is only a proxy for regional weather, 
which is only a proxy for human well-being, which depends on innumerable other 
factors for its achievement and maintenance” (Hulme 2019, np) 
 
Focusing mobilization on measures to reach these metrics could easily become part of a 
transition away from fossil fuels that overlooks questions of justice and precedent. A state of 
exception directed at climate change metrics leaves itself open to techno-fix faith or legal 
measures that not only fail to cut at the root of the problem, but also provide a platform for the 
complex of normalized negative sacrifices to continue and accelerate.16 This point resonates with 
Ghosh’s conceptualization of “The Great Derangement.” However, Ghosh also invokes 
emergency as a framework for climate change, saying that  
“...if whole societies and polities are to adapt then the necessary decisions will need 
to be made collectively, within political institutions, as happens in wartime or 
national emergencies. After all, isn’t that what politics, its most fundamental form, 
is about? Collective survival and the preservation of the body politic?” (2016: 60). 
                                                
16 In addition, it seems relevant to mention that negative sacrifices forced onto “others” in the state of American 
normalcy often directly serve the agenda and market interests of ruling elites.  
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But in a neoliberal nation-state, is insurance of collective survival included in the role of political 
institutions? Or are we supposed to pull our own bootstraps through the storms? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
INTERLUDE II | FREEZE DRIED BLUEBERRIES 
For a decade, my mother’s parents lived in a condominium a few blocks away from my 
childhood home. It smelled like multi-vitamins, the must of books, and essential oils, as my 
grandmother sought the health-food cure for her hyperthyroid. The television played Fox News 
constantly in the background. Rather the fore-front, as it was usually played loud enough that 
you could hear the indignant tone of the host from any room. 
Their front room was a guest bedroom. It had several dressers of old photographs and 
documents. A rocking chair. A cedar-chest full of quilts and blankets. And a bed. I must have 
dropped a marker under that bed, or perhaps I was just curious. Either way, when I was about 10 
I happened to lift up the bed skirt to find what must have been at least 40 large, uniform canisters 
of freeze-dried food. They were not self-prepared. Their containers were cheap, their lids plastic, 
the white labels simple. “Freeze-dried Blueberries,” one said. There was an expiration date 
stamped on top: March 2035.  
I realize now that my grandparents had been sold those freeze-dried blueberries by some 
charming telemarketer who was capitalizing off of strategically kindled apocalypse-fear.   
When my child self asked my parents about it, they explained that my grandparents 
intended to have food for the whole family (us included) if something were to go wrong. My dad 
said that he appreciated the thought, but that now that was his job. My dad didn’t buy 40 gallon 
containers of freeze dried fruit, though. He bought canned beans and gas masks. Rain barrels and 
jugs of gasoline. All stored …..  Just in case.  
I remember lying on the floor of my childhood bedroom trying to imagine what it would 
really be like to experience a situation that would demand that level of preparation. Would 
people be fighting in the streets? Would there be violence? Police? Would we really be holed up 
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in our house? Or would we need to escape somewhere, the stockpiles all for naught? I was a 
privileged child, sheltered from violence, war, shortages. I could only speculate, over and over 
again.  
I asked my mother about it, and she said that she didn’t know, but if the apocalypse 
happened, she wanted to “go early….” 
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CHAPTER THREE | APOCALYPSE 
Apocalypse… Now? 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, my methods and approach have been 
forming alongside the emergence(y) of a global pandemic. COVID-19, happening now, is 
arguably the “first” pandemic of this magnitude. There have been hundreds of thousands of 
deaths worldwide amidst social, political, and economic uncertainties. To “flatten the curve,” 
people across the world are engaged in “social distancing.” Physical distancing might be the 
more apt term, given that social practices still remain, albeit reconfigured and often involving 
digital communications.  
 A typical tweet on my twitter feed reads “How I thought we’d dress for the apocalypse vs 
how are actually dressing for the Apocalypse.” Two images are juxtaposed - the first is Charlize 
Theron in her role as Imperator Furiosa in the most recent Mad Max installation, Fury Road.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 3.1 “How I Thought We’d Be Dressing for the Apocalypse.”  
@Smorgasboredom Accessed 22 March 2020.  
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Head shaven, she wears dusty leather, holds a large gun, and a minimal prosthetic arm made of 
what look like “spare parts.” The second image is also Charlize Theron, this time in Young Adult. 
(See Image 3.1) Blonde and pony-tailed, she sports large sunglasses, Hello Kitty pajamas, 
sweatpants, and a purse dog. The tweet appears to have been published on the 22 of March. I 
first encountered this text and image combination from the account @Smorgasbordeom, but then 
saw it replicated almost identically several times over. It blended in with the surrounding tweets, 
which include personal stories of people losing loved ones to COVID-19, DIY mask-making 
advice, Tiger King memes, and tweets about wildlife reclaiming abandoned cities. Is this an 
apocalypse? 
 To whatever extent COVID-19 has opened up the tap on the flow of “apocalypse 
imaginaries,” the trend is not new. Ideas of apocalypse come from religious texts, from lived 
experiences of violence and collective loss like genocide and slavery, and from the media 
(Amanat and Bernhardsson 2002). In recent decades, diverse actors, including but not limited to 
the makers of films, religious websites, academic treatises, and megacorporations, have all 
engaged in co-production of apocalyptic narratives. Each variously manifests a collective 
imagination of planetary crisis in the form of apocalypse.  
 In this chapter, I focus in on discourses of apocalypse in order to raise questions about 
perceptions of normalcy, about the responsibilities of states (versus individuals) in crisis 
preparation, and about efforts to protect or destroy the status quo.  I approach apocalypse as a 
process rather than an singular “event” (i.e., “The Apocalypse”, capital A). Discourses of 
apocalypse present a previously existing picture of presumed “normalcy,” and then culminates in 
a changed world, in which the previous “normalcy” is lost.  
Normalcy -> Apocalypse -> Post-Apocalypse 
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This logic of apocalypse carries not only designations of “pre,” and “post,” but also the sense 
that apocalypses have transformational power. Things are fundamentally different in the after.  
 In attempting to explore the assemblage of apocalypse in this light, I first examine the 
origins of apocalyptic narrative, from religious eschatology (speculation at end times and last 
things) to blockbuster North American film. I then identify the ways in which apocalypse itself is 
sold, as neoliberal shock, as white affective stories, and as all kinds of “survival gear” purchases. 
I argue that white affective narratives of apocalypse in Hollywood films are positioned to defend 
white disaster capitalist normalcy. I then turn to modes of apocalypse storytelling in which 
apocalypse is represented as an escalation of white disaster capitalist normalcy rather than a 
disruption of normalcy.  
I then think with the figure of “the Prepper” in order to explore the impact of different 
apocalypse stories on modalities of preparation. I consider apocalypse-preparation as a space in 
which the neoliberal notion of “resilience” is brought into tension with imaginaries which use 
apocalypse (and adjoining post-apocalypse) as openings to speculate at how to make post-
disaster (capitalism) societies. I end arguing that apocalypse narratives are sites where people 
produce, reproduce, and negotiate what constitutes cultural and collective threat. I also consider 
the implications of apocalypse discourse for not only collective imaginaries of crisis, but also 
determination of “normalcy.” 
 
Origins of Apocalypse 
Apocalypse is a Greek word meaning “revelation,” in reference to the unveiling of things 
which could not be known before. This includes the divine knowledge revealed by (a) God, new 
knowledge that could then be construed as the conditions of the “new world” (Sheposh 2019). 
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The first apocalypticism is thought to have roots in Zoroastrianism, commonly cited as the oldest 
continuously practiced human religion. Apocalypse then became more defined and 
sensationalized in Abrahaimic traditions, such as in the book of Revelation in the Christian Bible 
(Sheposh 2019). Both Judaic and Christian traditions specifically tend to conceptualize 
apocalypse as the return (or arrival) of a God to Earth, where “He” punishes the forces of evil in 
a great battle. In Hinduism, which includes the belief that the universe is constantly in a cycle of 
death and rebirth, it is prophesied that the god Vishnu will return to earth during a time of great 
immorality and evil and destroy it with a sword shaped like a comet (Sheposh 2019). There is 
also an apocalypse in Norse beliefs (Ragnarök), in which the Norse gods and giants destroy the 
Earth in the crossfire of a great battle, which serves as a beginning for collective rebirth (Amanat 
and Bernhardsson 2002). 
The colloquial use of the term apocalypse is not always intended to invoke the religious 
connotations of the term. Often it comes to be associated with large-scale disasters, societal 
collapse, and the formation of “dystopia” rather than universal extinction. Apocalypse is the term 
that pushes knowledge about crisis over the threshold of “emergency” normalcy into a dark and 
fantastic exceptionalism, one that says the circumstances of the crisis are so unique in their 
extremity that they obliterate the “normal” beyond recognition. Apocalypse conjures fantastic 
episodes of violence, death, and chaos. During an apocalypse, the chaos and conflict are so great 
that systems fail - society collapses. In the wasteland of the post-apocalypse, whatever remains 
of humankind (or whatever remains of something other-than-human) is left to rebuild, or merely 
just struggle to survive. In the construction of apocalypse, then, both the apocalyptic 
event/process and the future post-apocalypse become an opening for projection and futuring. To 
engage with apocalypse is to tap into a layered (or bundled, rather) set of meta-narratives that 
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encompasses not only violence and death, monsters and aliens, but also the nature of social 
change. It is mobilized in storytelling practices both as a powerful fictional narrative of change, 
and as a concept to describe lived histories of violence and social change.   
 
Disaster Capitalism and the Cleaning of the Slate 
Disaster capitalism refers to the exploitation of disasters, from economic crises to 
hurricanes to mass violence (Klein 2007). Private sector entities like private lenders, security 
firms, and developers create profits from disadvantage and further exacerbate inequities that 
prime societies for crisis and chaos in the first place. Part and parcel to neoliberalism, disaster 
capital feeds on market logics like reducing state regulations, strengthening protections for 
investors and traders, and privatizing public services (Klein 2007). Neoliberalism has been 
integrated into mainstream society such that wealth is a virtue of “free competition” triumphs, 
citizens are redefined as consumers, and the state is primarily responsible for protecting the 
functionality of the market, leaving the longevity and security of individuals in their own hands. 
 The same transformational power by which apocalypse turns normalcy into post-
apocalypse is the logic that drives “The Shock Doctrine,” an idea that has played a crucial role in 
institutionalizing disaster capitalism and neoliberal globalization. (Klein 2007). When Milton 
Friedman and his students in the Chicago School of Economics sought to test out the ideology of 
neoliberalism, they lent a hand or two to military dictator Augusto Pincohet, who seized power 
in Chile in 1973 via a US-backed coup (Sheppard et al 2009). Pinochet overthrew and murdered 
the democratically elected president Salvador Allende, launching Chile headfirst into austere 
economic reform outlined ahead of time by Friedman’s students, Los Chicago Boys (Sheppard et 
al 2009). In addition to suffering through Pinochet’s high-profile mass-torture and murders, 
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Chileans found their market flooded by cheap American products and American contractors, 
price controls eliminated, social services cut, and constitution re-written to institutionalize 
neoliberal ethics.  As is typically the case with waves of neoliberal reform, inequality surged, the 
poor grew drastically poorer, while elites grew their wealth and power (Klein 2007). 
That coup serves as the first example of a crisis administered as a part of the “Shock 
Doctrine,” a tactic that involves shocking a subject (whether individual or society target) in order 
to “wipe clean the slate” for the implementation of something new (Klein 2007). Naomi Klein, 
who wrote the aptly titled book The Shock Doctrine, identifies C.I.A. torture tactics as the basis 
for the Shock Doctrine (2007). Based on C.I.A. torture tactics, the Shock Doctrine capitalizes on 
the complete disorientation and break from reality that a “shocked” subject experiences (Klein 
2007). The shock can be a “natural” disaster (like Hurricane Katrina) or otherwise out-of-human-
control incident (like a pandemic), or it can be strategically manufactured (like the US war in 
Iraq). This is where apocalypse comes into play - it takes an apocalyptic wiping away of the 
before to truly “wipe the slate” clean enough to implement neoliberalism. Friedman himself is 
quoted as saying: 
“only a crisis - actual or perceived - produces real change. When that crisis 
occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. 
That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing 
policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible 
becomes political inevitable.” (Klein, 2007: 50) 
 
The assertion of the Shock Doctrine proved to be pretty effective, and it has ushered in an age of 
disaster capitalism like no other. In disaster capitalist normalcy, there are established markets 
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and ideologues poised to stir up and profit from crisis. And they have already profited from the 
major planetary-scale crises (again, Hurricane Katrina comes to mind) (Klein 2007).17 
 I engage with these ideas to bring them into conversation with “apocalypse” and 
planetary crisis. Essentially, I argue that in light of planetary-scale crisis, disaster capitalism 
operates on shaky ground. When disaster capitalism needs a new influx of funds, new markets 
are created, new shocks are administered. However, alongside capitalism’s propensity for using 
finite “natural resources” at an alarming pace and emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere 
en masse, the proverbial “social fracking” of disaster capitalism risks causing an earthquake too 
big to handle. It risks creating an apocalypse. In addition, neoliberalism complicates the 
relationship of society, crisis, and state in crisis by loading responsibility for security and 
resilience onto individuals.  
 
“Apocatainment” 
Currently one of the most powerful fields in which “apocalypse” thrives is contemporary 
North American cinema, particularly blockbuster films which are building on an American 
apocalyptic tradition rooted in Puritan Calvinism (Moya and Lopez 2017).18 At first glance, the 
entertainment industry has had no shortage of apocalyptic imagination, as seemingly every kind 
of disaster from alien invasion to viral zombie outbreak to climate change gone wrong is 
implemented in a blockbuster movie, TV drama, comic, or book. Gwendolyn Audrey Foster uses 
                                                
17 But at the same time, because the neoliberal ideology which formed contemporary disaster capitalism is a “pure” 
form of capitalism whose implementation entrenched values which already ruled in American society (like rugged 
individualism and the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few), the “change” which occurs a 
result of the Shock Doctrine is symbolically empty and reinforces what already was. 
 
18 Also worth noting (but skipped here) is the proliferation of Young Adult literature (and sometimes accompanying 
blockbuster franchises) which capitalizes on dystopia. This is the field that gives us the Hunger Games, the 
“Divergent” series and the trope  
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the term “apocatainment” to describe the vast array of media in which apocalypse plays a 
narrative or contextual role (2014). I would include in my conception of apocatainment the many 
stories concerning what happens post-apocalypse, where many a fictional dystopia has been 
formed. 
 And the drama of the apocalypse sells well. For instance, there is a decades long tradition 
of American disaster films, which arguably originated with the science-fiction cinema of the 
Cold War, carried through turn-of-the-millenium anxiety, and took on renewed vigor post 9/11 
(Moya and Lopez 2017).19 Apocatainment profits by marketing apocalypse (and post-
apocalypse) in all forms - as “feel good ending” blockbuster films with symbol-laden hero-
figures (Armageddon, I Am Legend, 2012), as “gritty” sci-fi future projections (The Matrix, Mad 
Max, World War Z), as a platform for celebrity-based comedy (This Is The End, Shaun of the 
Dead, Zombieland), as a catalyst for romance (Seeking A Friend for the End of the World), as the 
premise for horror (Bird Box, A Quiet Place), and even as reality TV (Doomsday Preppers).  
 
The type of disaster portrayed and the meanings assigned to apocalypse varies. Often 
apocalyptic cinema manifests social unease or worry, but the source and expression of that worry 
differs. For example, one apocatainment flic might feature an apocalypse driven by dramatic 
anthropogenic effects on the environment (like 2012), while another might feature a zombie 
apocalypse, where encroaching racialized hordes are the threat to white normalcy (like World 
War Z) (Gergan, Smith, and Vasudevan 2020). Many turn-of-the-century post-apocalypse 
movies (like The Road, The Book of Eli, and I Am Legend) use the post-apocalypse to envision 
                                                
19 Essentially, coincident with the common conception of how planetary crisis discourse emerged in the United 
States.  
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potentials beyond the end of culture and the state as they are known now (Moya and Lopez 
2017).  
And yet, the same tropes keep cropping up over and over again. The white male 
protagonist protects his family from a zombie horde of “others.” The protagonist maintains 
humanity and morality despite the abject chaos and cannibalism that surrounds him. A 
technological fix is sought, and usually found. While the tropes might seem initially innocuous, 
they tap into a political orientation towards apocalypse that both values rugged individualism and 
white cisheteronormative American “normalcy.” 
In “Earth Beyond Repair: Race and apocalypse in collective imagination,” Mabel 
Gergan, Sara Smith, and Pavitra Vasudevan analyze apocalyptic film tropes in relation to the 
concept of Anthropocene, as the collective imaginaries shaping and shaped by apocalyptic film 
influences the conception of Anthropocene like any other element of planetary crisis. They point 
out that “apocalyptic imaginings have often been framed through an exclusionary hierarchy of 
humanity, necessitating closer examination of how cliched genre conventions that saturate our 
media environment rely on anti-Black racism and indigenous erasure,” and that “without such 
attention, we risk reiterating these cliches in narrating environmental crisis” (Gergan, Smith, and 
Vasudevan 2020). Essentially, tropes and cliches that are reliant on anti-Black racism and 
indigenous erasure have the potential to influence collective imaginaries of crisis from their role 
in apocalyptic media. The authors identify three trends of apocalyptic film which play into this: 
“The Great Deluge” (climatic conditions or unpredictable nature overtaking humanity), “Nuclear 
Cataclysm” (the role of toxic and nonhuman agents), and “The Population Bomb” (a neo-
Malthusian suggestion of the threat of numerous “others”). 
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Films which feature a “Great Deluge” (like the “cli-fi” blockbuster The Day After 
Tomorrow [2004]) are intended to convey a cataclysmic threat to humankind, but more often 
than not the “universal human subject” being threatened is the white male and Northern 
Hemisphere locations which he represents. Gergan, Smith and Vasudevan suggest this 
representation of crisis buys into “what Baldwin (2016:84) terms a white affect, a ‘pre-discursive 
intensity that forms when white positionality confronts the fantasy of its own death’” (2020). In 
doing so, these narratives erase actual extreme weather events which differentially affect 
vulnerable communities and livelihoods. This erasure contributes, in turn, to collective 
imaginaries of planetary crisis that center white maleness as the benchmark for what must be 
threatened to consider a phenomenon a crisis.   
A similar idea can be seen when “white decline” and other threats to white supremacy 
become embedded in apocalyptic film narratives through white protagonists championing 
“normal” values and actions in the face of hordes of racialized “others” who [over]populate the 
apocalypse (whether it be as densities of zombies, or as nameless poor folk driven to cannibalism 
and violence). Think Brad Pitt’s protagonist in World War Z versus the zombies around him.  
In the process of surveying popular apocalyptic films, Gergan, Smith, and Vasudevan 
identify a series of “warning signs” that mark white affect. First, “the apocalypse is 
coming,”projects apocalyptic crisis into the future all the while erasing already existing 
conditions of “racial apocalypse” and other elements of violence and elimination interpreted 
through an apocalyptic logic (Gergan, Smith, and Vasudevan 2020). Second, “Humans vs. the 
Horde” refers to the cinematic image of a white male protagonist threatened by a crisis of people 
which is people, reflected in real policy as concern over “scarcity” and Neo-Malthusian 
interpretations of overpopulation as a planetary crisis. 3) “Science is Magic” is the idea that 
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apocalypse can be averted by a technofix or otherwise patched, rather than acknowledging 
systemic problems. Attention to the types of disasters portrayed includes observation of the 
decline of trends over time (like the gradual disappearance of “Nuclear Cataclysm,” suggesting 
that other planetary-scale concerns have grown more immediate in the public eye). And “Epic 
Reversals” refers to a narrative where the oppressors become the oppressed and vice versa, like 
wealthy white America being threatened and displaced by those holding positionalities that are 
dispossessed by whiteness and American settler colonialism and capitalism in reality (Gergan, 
Smith, and Vasudevan 2020). Each of these reinforce the idea that the boundaries of 
“apocalypse” is centered around threat to normalized (disaster) capitalist white supremacy, rather 
than collective human wellbeing. “Epic Reversals,” “Science is Magic” and “Humans vs. the 
Horde” specifically contribute to a sense of Heglar’s “existential exceptionalism.”  
 
Parable of the Sower 
All of this said, not all apocalypse stories center threat to capitalist white supremacist 
“normalcy.” This includes modes of science fiction and speculative fiction that take up the 
perspectives of marginalized identities. One work which does this is Octavia Butler’s 1993 
apocalyptic speculative fiction classic The Parable of the Sower.  
Set in a futuristic California (from 2024-2027), the premise of Parable is that climate 
change and other crises are plaguing the Earth and leading to mass violence, prolific migration, 
and apocalyptic loss of life. However, rather than a fantastic disaster (or “Great Deluge”), 
Parable’s apocalypse is evocative of the everyday, America past and present. Parable’s 
protagonist is a young Black woman named Lauren Olamina whose family and most of her 
neighborhood are killed by a mob of drug-fueled arsonists. This tragedy catalyzes her journey 
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North with an ever-growing group of allies. As they travel, the narrative reveals that company 
towns (where residents all work for the corporate owner of the land and receive “company 
credit” as payment) and human slavery (justified through debt) are making a comeback. All the 
while, Olamina teaches her comrades the emerging version of religion, Earthseed, which holds 
that “God” is simply the principle of change. Ultimately, Olamina and her allies survive in 
numbers due to their growing mutual trust.  
The book (which does have a sequel) ends with Lauren and a group of roughly 15 
investing in an autonomous Earthseed community, representing an investment in collective 
power and community rather than a masculine, rugged individual survival. While Parable is 
certainly an apocalyptic story, its approach to both what characterizes the apocalypse (escalation 
of American normalcy rather than disruption) and how the protagonist reacts to the 
circumstances (putting value in collaboration rather than rugged individual heroism) set up a 
different sort of future-projection than a typical apocatainment blockbuster. Parable and other 
narratives like it use the apocalypse narrative to explore what counts as “apocalyptic” and how to 
envision futures beyond culture and society as they are known now. In that way, it is an exercise 
of collective imagination.  
 
Preppers and Preparedness 
The show Doomsday Preppers, which ran on the National Geographic Channel from 
2011 to 2014, profiled a variety of “preppers,” their prepper gear, and the cause of the end-times 
that they were preparing for. At the time, these “preppers” were made out to be people on the 
fringe of society, as irrational “survivalists” and paranoid wearers of the “tin-hat.” And yet, in 
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March 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 outbreak, Doomsday Preppers was suddenly 
trending on streaming services.  
In this section, I turn to the figure of the prepper and the practice of apocalypse prepping 
as an active response to perceived threat. I work specifically with Kezia Barker’s research of 
prepper communities and “subcultures” in the United Kingdom. I will argue that modes of 
preparation differ based on the apocalypse (or simple crisis) being prepared for.  
While research often portrays preppers as a subculture, Barker underscores that the 
diversity of the phenomena. There is diversity at all levels: in terms of actors involved, their 
motivations and political orientations, the variety of skills and practices they undertake, and their 
modes of communication (Barker 2019). Barker argues that prepping is “best understood as a 
spectrum,” saying that:  
 “In some iterations, prepping merges happily with bushcraft and wild camping; in others, 
a more overt militarised survivalism is exhibited and the bushcraft hipster is deplored; and 
more universally, the terms ‘armchair prepper’ and ‘doomsday prepper’ function as 
distancing devices…” (Barker 2019: 6).  
However, I conceptualize it as an assemblage, because it is a nonlinear agglomeration of 
different orientations towards understanding and responding to crisis.  
Barker (2019) does a literature review of scholarship on preppers, and identifies that 
many have conceptualized “prepping” as an “attitudinal state” among people who share common 
appeals and anxieties about insecurity and disaster. They have also analyzed prepping as an 
embodiment of masculinity in crisis, a rugged individualism complex, or a “bunker mentality 
towards preserving middle-class heterosexual priviledge,” (Barker 2019: 7). Rather than using 
any of these interpretations as a singular classification of prepping, Barker suggests that prepper 
subjectivity might be best grasped through its material practices, like stock-piling, assembling 
bug-out bags, acquiring wilderness survival skills, and using ham radio. Preparation practices are 
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expressions of future imaginations, “performed in relation to the crisis coordinates of the 
neoliberal capitalist and weak democratic present,” (Barker 2019: 7).  
Whatever the reality of prepping-culture might be, the figure of the prepper has been 
conflated in many media representations, including in Doomsday Preppers, with paranoid 
apocalyptic theories of social collapse, electromagnetic pulses, and polar shifts. Barker points out 
that this positioning of the prepper becomes something of a measuring stick by which “ordinary 
people” are meant to gauge their own level of rationality (Barker 2019). Despite this, prepper-
hood is not explicitly married to apocalypse or doomsday - some self-identified preppers 
distance themselves from the extremes in order to regain credibility as “rational thinkers” merely 
preparing for earthquakes or hurricanes. However, apocalypse and preparation have a particular 
resonance which cannot be overlooked, especially as it comes to involve planetary crisis 
discourse. 
While “prepping” has roots in the survivalist movements of the twentieth century, 
prepping came to force in the United States post-9/11, as the government started encouraging 
citizens to be more personally disaster-prepared and kick-started neoliberal security culture 
(Barker 2019). One of the most common core values of American preppers is a strong focus on 
self-sufficiency, which is often influenced by a sense that it is an able-bodied individual’s 
responsibility to society to take care of themselves rather than relying on the state – a core tenant 
of neoliberalism.  One clear demonstration of this is unfolding as the United States government is 
encouraging citizens to make COVID-19 masks out of old t-shirts rather than nationalizing 
industry to manufacture proper Personal Protective Equipment for essential workers. 
While disaster capitalism profits off of chaos and disruption, it also makes a bet with 
itself that already neoliberal societies can remain resilient enough to bounce back from repeated 
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shocks with the status-quo intact. Again, neoliberal resilience places the onus of preparation on 
individuals and individual families. Apocalypse-prepping both supports this sentiment and 
complicates it. Doomsday preppers assume that society will collapse, and that therefore 
individuals must take care of themselves, feeding into rugged individualist complexes. At the 
same time, allowing for the potential of an apocalypse which wipes away the “normal” of before 
can open a window to practices of preparation and prediction that moves past neoliberal disaster 
capitalism.  
I argue that like interpretations and stories of apocalypse differ on the relationship 
between the threat and normalcy, Prepper-hood is also a practice which varies specifically based 
on conceptualization of the threat. Some preppers are buying into white affective narratives like 
the ones furthered in movies (although, in some cases, this narrative of threat is based on The 
News rather than fictional media), and that is what motivates them to prep. And some “preppers” 
are simply planetary crisis-concerned. Some preppers are engaging with fear over changes to 
disrupt normacy, while some fear escalated normalcy. I argue that the differences between these 
two orientations towards prepping can be represented by two disparate figures - disgraced former 
evangelical TV host Jim Bakker, and “Deep Adaptation” author Jem Bendell.  
 
Bakker was formerly the host of the “Praise the Lord” (PTL) Television Network (Hull 
1987). After serving five years of a 45-year sentence for financial indiscretions, has been trying 
to cash in on his former fame to make money by conjuring apocalyptic projections online 
(jimbakkershow.com). Essentially, “the Jim Bakker Show” broadcasts commercials for freeze-
dried food with decades-long shelf lives (perfect supplies for the apocalypse!) in between talk-
show segments, sermons, and false-news reports that inform the viewer about incoming attacks 
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from North Korea and sales on “end times literature” like The Islamic Antichrist and The Trump 
Prophecies. Bakker, while he isn’t at the level of popularity that he used to be in the PTL Club 
days, profits by demonizing real groups of people already rendered as threatening “others” by 
right-wing news sources in the US and colonial logics of difference(Abelman 1989). In this way, 
those who are convinced by Bakker are buying into white affective apocalypse stories. 
And he is not the only one to do so. Plenty of other telemarketers and salesmen have 
cashed in on simple apocalyptic fear-mongering and selling prepper goods. Now, even sites that 
avoid the connotations of “prepping,” and especially the kind of marketing that Jim Bakker is 
associated with (like the greenwashed, Thrive Life, which also sells bulk freeze-dried food) are 
experiencing booms in the customer service, from the fear surrounding the pandemic.20 And in 
the meantime, Jim Bakker is being sued by the state of Mississippi for selling a fake cure for 
COVID-19.21  
On the other hand, Jem Bendell’s approach to inspiring preparation is more based on 
collective decision making. The story goes that Dr. Jem Bendell invested time in doing a 
thorough survey of all climate science and what it meant for the future. What he found startled 
him so badly that when he was done, he tried to publish “Deep Adaptation: A Map for 
Navigating Climate Tragedy,” and only succeeded in having it released as an occasional paper 
(Bendell 2018) because the editors of the journals that he submitted to did not appreciate his 
message or tone. What Bendell had done was write pages and pages about the short-term 
inevitability of complete social collapse, encouraging his audience of sustainability academics 
and professionals to reassess their careers and livelihoods. In this paper, he describes a number 
                                                
20 https://www.thrivelife.com/, accessed 2 May 2020 
21https://www.npr.org/2020/03/11/814550474/missouri-sues-televangelist-jim-bakker-for-selling-fake-coronavirus-
cure 
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of ways in which “you [the reader] will experience dramatic forms of violence, pain, and social 
distress,” effectively trying to shock his readers into realizing the gravity of the science.  
What he wasn’t expecting was the paper to “go viral” (relatively viral, as an academic 
paper) - over 110,00 people have downloaded the occasional paper. In addition, there are a 
number of support forums and a Facebook group called “Positive Deep Adaptation,” where 
readers of the paper tend to flock after being unsettled by the content. It has even inspired people 
to begin changing their lives (to begin “prepping”), including Dr. Alice Green, the former pro 
vice-chancellor of Arden University (Tsjeng 2019) and the author of this Medium article 
(Grimes 2019). Both of these people said that they were inspired to leave behind extended family 
and career to move into a rural area which is forecasted to be less seriously impacted by climate 
change. However, this isn’t necessarily prescribed directly by Deep Adaptation.  
Bendell’s framework for response to social collapse and apocalypse is three R’s: 
resilience, relinquishment, and restorations (2018). He says that: 
 Resilience asks us “how do we keep what we really want to keep?” 
Relinquishment asks us “what do we need to let go of in order to not make matters 
worse?” Restoration asks us “what can we bring back to help us with the coming 
difficulties and tragedies?” (2018) 
 
According to the paper, these questions are meant to be pondered collectively, as societies. This 
is Bendell’s attempt at a framework for how to respond and be oriented towards immediate 
crisis. It seems to be trying to get at addressing the underlying conditions of the unjust and 
exploitative systems which landed the planet in crisis in the first place - as “relinquishment” 
suggests that there are cultural values and privileges (like consumerism, for example) that might 
just need to be totally rejected. He also poses this set of questions to the reader: “Should you 
drop everything now and move somewhere more suitable for self-sufficiency? Should you be 
spending time reading the rest of this article? Should I even finish writing it?” (Bendell 2018).  
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 Bendell is radically different from Bakker because he is trying to bring collective 
imaginaries to the table in trying to solve the crisis. Deep Adaptation and the three R’s of 
Resilience, Relinquishment, and Restoration requires the practice of having collective 
conversations about dealing with collective loss and making collective (positive) sacrifices. 
Juxtaposing the two emphasizes the tension between individual and collective “prepper” 
practice. However, it must be noted that there is plenty of room for overlap - one could stockpile 
food and learn survival skills and simultaneously be prepared to help neighbors and to have 
collective conversations about sacrifice and community resilience. However, Bendell and Bakker 
as apocalyptic storytellers clearly differ in their conceptualization of crisis. Deep adaptation 
rejects “normalcy,” and adapts by pushing social change (like “relinquishment”). Bakker’s 
apocalyptic newscast profits directly off of the demonization of racialized and otherwise 
“othered” people in order to conjure threats to American normalcy. These two are irreconcilable 
because their relationships to “normalcy” are so different.  
 
Troubling Pre-Apocalyptic Normalcy 
Because the designation “apocalypse” is by definition preceded by a normalcy being 
disrupted, defining the boundaries of “apocalypse” are dependent on the subjective definition of 
“normalcy''. But what is normal? Moreover, what parts of the normal might be contributing to 
the conditions of planetary crisis?  
Indeed, the moniker apocalypse has been applied to the early formations of American 
“normalcy”. For instance, in discussing the (falsely) novel connotations of the term 
“Anthropocene,” Kyle Whyte referred to the settler colonial project and the genocide of Native 
peoples in the Americas as an apocalypse, saying that: 
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“Indigenous imaginations of our futures in relation to climate change - the stuff of 
didactic science fiction - begin already with our living today in post-apocalyptic situation. 
Had someone told our ancestors a story of what today’s times are like for Indigenous 
peoples, our ancestors would surely have thought they were hearing dystopian tales. For 
Indigenous people live in worlds so changed by colonialism, capitalism and 
industrialization that our collective self-determination and agency are compromised to a 
degree our ancestors would have been haunted by,” (Whyte 2017: 160). 
 
In this configuration, American “normalcy” that would be disrupted by the apocalypse of, say, 
climate change, is already experienced by some as post-apocalypse. That said, a new apocalypse 
would continue to exacerbate the already existing vulnerabilities and injustices of the “normal.” 
If climate change is the apocalypse, then the apocalypse has already meant that once again 
indigenous folks are being forced to move from their homes and ancestral land (as is already the 
case with the Isle de Jean Charles band of Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Tribe).  
 In essence, some of it comes down to the same questions that can be applied to other 
crisis terms - at what point is normalized violence or life-disruption no longer normal but a 
“crisis” or an “emergency?” If American “normalcy” is being destroyed by an apocalypse, hasn’t 
it already begun? If not then at what point does it actually begin? Will it only begin once those 
who are normally left secure are affected? Recent disasters (not only including COVID-19, but 
also phenomena like the West Coast wildfires and intensified storms) have indicated what 
normalcy looks like in crisis. During a global pandemic, the wealthy are the first to have access 
to tests, and BIPOC communities are disproportionately affected. When wealthy areas of Los 
Angeles have been evacuated for an oncoming fire, there have been multiple reports of 
housekeepers left behind who are either unaware of the danger or more scared of losing their job 
than a fire (Mejia 2019). And I personally believe that if a mountain-leveling comet were to 
appear in the sky and threaten rapidly approaching apocalypse, that the elites would rapture 
themselves into the bunkers that they’ve been preparing in New Zealand for years. 
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 First, I argue that the logic of apocalypse (which changes normalcy into post-apocalypse) 
is a parallel logic to the neoliberal “Shock Doctrine,.” in the sense of that is doing the work of 
disruption and transformation. Disorient as much as possible. “New normal”.  However, I also 
argue that because disaster capitalism and broader neoliberalism are now “normalcy,” the 
“apocalypse” of planetary scale crisis also threatens the long term viability of these systems. 
Therefore, while the use of “apocalypse” in planetary crisis discourse risks invoking white 
affective narratives (as seen in apocatainment films), it is also a meta-narrative that can provide 
theoretical space for speculation at futures beyond the state and social organization/culture as it 
is known now. In addition, I argue that apocalypse is also a theoretical space where concepts of 
preparation clash. Mainstream “prepper-hood” in reaction to a perceived apocalyptic threat tends 
to fall under the category of hyper-individualized, neoliberal preparation, in which social 
resilience is completely reliant on the “personal responsibility” of individuals and assumes the 
loss of the vulnerable. On another hand, there are emergent narratives of preparation for 
planetary-scale crisis (such as Deep Adaptation) which begin to trouble the neoliberal prepper 
rejection of broader community resilience systems. Therefore, I argue that neoliberal ideology 
limits the formation of collective “preparatory” practice and imaginaries.  
 
 In addition, I argue that apocatainment films overall reinforce (disaster) capitalist white 
supremacy as normalcy, at the same time as positioning that normalcy as the victim of 
apocalyptic forces. This erases lived experiences and histories of arguably apocalyptic loss and 
violence experienced at the hands of that normalcy. Therefore, using “apocalypse” to describe 
conditions of contemporary planetary crisis must be carefully examined in context at the risk of 
activating that erasure and the accompanying cultural imaginary that planetary crises like climate 
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change are novel (rather than rooted in systemic issues). I also argue that the proliferation of 
apocalyptic stories which glorify the rugged individual protagonist actively work against the 
formation of cultural imaginaries based on collective action and power.  
It is relatively easy for the privileged to brush off white affective and neoliberal tropes as 
“just fiction,” but the reality is that the power of (apocalyptic) storytelling shapes collective 
orientations towards crisis so much so that real action (e.g., US policy) is often clearly delineated 
from white apocalyptic cultural imaginaries and fictional planetary crisis discourse. For instance, 
the U.S. Army recently sponsored a “Mad Scientist Science Fiction Writing Contest” where 
participants were encouraged to write about “the future of warfare and technology… with 
implications for how the Army operates in future conflicts” (Gergan, Smith, and Vasudevan 
2020). In other words, the stories gathered from civilian writers would inform military policy.  
Despite this link to militarization, I still argue that the power of apocalypse-narrative in fiction to 
hold open space for future-projection can be used for more critical speculation at social change 
in response to planetary crisis.  
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INTERLUDE III | CIGARETTE SMOKING AND THE ROTH IRA 
The edition of the New Yorker magazine published on January 13 of 2020 featured a 
cartoon drawn by Emily Flake that pictures a couple standing outside a home with what is meant 
to be a real estate agent, and a child in their arms. The caption is simple - it reads “I know the 
schools are great, but is this really the house we want to ride out the apocalypse in?” 
I sat with one of my close friends on my porch a while back, maybe six months ago at the 
writing of this. We were watching traffic roll down King Street. As I mentioned before, I nurse 
the rather unhealthy habit of smoking cigarettes. My friend was asking me if I wanted another 
one, and I can remember pausing and then it came out, accidentally, unconsciously - “Sure, 
we’re all going to die in 20 years anyway, what does it matter?” 
It’s a ridiculous statement - Any number of things could happen to me sooner than 20 
years, and I do tend to believe that the choices we make now matter. It’s also particularly tone-
deaf to privilege. People are dying now as a result of planetary-scale crisis. People are dying now 
in accidents. Anyway, this wasn’t the type of sentiment that I was trying to spread about. But 
sometimes it just slips out. Sometimes, after days of reading climate science for class, I find it 
difficult to plan for the future.  
Like when it comes that time of year, tax season, when I really am supposed to be putting 
money into the Roth IRA that I started with the money from my very first job. It feels ridiculous. 
What exactly am I buying into? I’m 21 years old. I was born in 1998. If somehow I retired at 65, 
the year would be 2063. I find myself doing the math, all the time. The time feels heavy. Is this 
really the house that I want to ride out the Apocalypse in? I’m not saying that we’re all definitely 
doing to die. But I am saying that I’m not invested in this Roth IRA normalcy anymore.  
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CHAPTER FOUR | EXTINCTION 
The Sixth Mass Extinction 
Extinction typically refers to the death of an entire species. It is a shared, collective death, 
drawn out over time. At a certain level, species extinctions are considered normal events, 
balanced with the natural emergence of new species, an idea that dates back to Darwin (Sodikoff 
2012). Extinction studies scholar Thom van Dooren suggests that rather than extinction being the 
state of every individual of a species being gone, extinction ought to be thought of as an 
entangled process of collective loss, in which the death of each individual is slowly shaping the 
existence of the species (or categorization outside of “species,” like “flight way”) and 
contributing to its collective death (2014). This conceptualization exposes extinction as a slow 
pattern of loss and ecological reverberation. It is not a moment, but a “dull edge” drawn out over 
time and space (van Dooren 2014).  
In contrast to the background rate, a “mass extinction” is an abnormal escalation.22 
During mass extinction events, the rate of extinction rises rapidly and plays out over a larger 
geographic area. According to scientists, five mass extinctions have already occurred on this 
planet over the past 500 million years. The most recent of those was the “K-T” extinction, which 
annihilated the dinosaurs and 75% of all living species (Sodikoff 2012). And the next mass 
extinction? Increasingly, biologists and other scientists are saying that it’s happening now 
(Ceballos et al 2015).  
Up until the sudden emergence of COVID-19, climate change was catching headlines and 
beginning to take the spotlight on public discourse on planetary-scale crisis. Since 1991 
                                                
22 The average rate of extinction (outside of “mass” events) is referred to as the background rate. Projections about 
mass extinction are based on demonstrations that the current rate exceeds the “natural” background rate by a 
consistently significant amount (Ceballos et al 2015).  
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(measured up to 2016), media coverage of climate change was up to eight times higher than 
coverage of “biodiversity loss” or mass extinction (Legagneux et al 2018). Yet, there are 
certainly some who consider Mass Extinction just as serious (if not more serious) a threat than 
climate change. This is because the entangled consequences of mass extinction supersede the 
loss of individual species to also include the destruction of ecosystems and the associated 
“services” provided to humans by those ecosystems (like crop pollination or water 
purification/filtration). This means risks for food systems, energy economies, and human health 
(Heise 2010). Moreover, losses in greater biodiversity typically undermine capacity for 
adaptation and resilience in the face of other threats and disasters. Major drivers include habitat 
loss and fragmentation (the fragmenting of landscapes accessible to non-humans) due to shifts in 
land use (extractionism; deforestation; industrialized farming; toxic air, soil, and waters) and 
overharvesting linked to neoliberal globalization (Fagundez 2012). Thus, the Sixth Mass 
Extinction stands apart from the other mass extinction events in its causes. For this same reason, 
and the similarity of scale, Climate Change and Mass Extinction are sometimes called “twin”  
threats (Ceballos et al 2015).  
 
With the conditions of the Sixth Mass Extinction in mind, this chapter explores how 
discourses of extinction shape collective imaginaries concerning planetary-scale crisis. The 
concept of extinction in American or Western understandings is typically associated with 
environmentalism, and species conservation, as American environmentalism is concerned with 
protecting a declining nature. Concerns about extinction (or other “environmental” concerns) are 
directed towards environmentalist sentiments and conservation practices. Environmentalism is 
the primary story of the American relationship with nature (and land, which is life), and therefore 
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it is a site of extinction storytelling as well. However, the story told is typically the one of the 
plight of the charismatic species, and of American (settler) identity. Worried about planetary 
crisis? Save the whales. And although American environmentalism has a fraught relationship 
with human death, complete human extinction is rarely on the radar.  
Speculating at the potential of human extinction is to consider not only the stuff of life 
and death, but being and not being, and the entanglements that humankind is in with its 
surroundings (living and not-living). Despite the best efforts of environmentalists, the planet is 
still in crisis. Coming to terms with the potential of human extinction also means coming to 
terms with the collective losses that happen along the way.  
In exploring discourses of extinction and planetary crisis, I found that there were two 
major sites of analysis at hand - first, American environmentalism and species conservation, and 
then a sense of impending human extinction expressed as “we’re all going to die,” or Doomer-
ism. Doomerism is a shared sense of pessimism, nihilism, and hopelessness in the face of 
“inevitable” extinction. While at first glance these two concepts seem disparate, they merely 
represent two different but still prominent modes of reckoning with collective loss and death. 
And they both share a similar orientation towards white settler exceptionalism.  
 
I begin by introducing American environmentalism, where extinction and biodiversity are 
invoked as extensions of “wilderness,” a concept entangled with settler colonialism and 
American identity. There I will argue that using “extinction” in environmentalist discourse limits 
collective imaginaries of crisis in dangerous ways, and I will link this phenomenon back to 
existential exceptionalism. Secondly, I examine the positioning of “charismatic species,” as 
emblems of extinction, which I argue potentially redirect too much energy from efforts to 
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address mass extinction overall. And last, I will think with “Doomers” as representations of 
pessimistic, privileged perspectives on planetary-crisis that have become a lively site of 
collective conversations on how crisis might be responded to appropriately. I argue that 
extinction is a threat which necessitates collective conversation and responses beyond the 
“normal” systems of handling crises (like emergency services).  
 
In this chapter, I relate certain operations of extinction and environmentalism to what Eve 
Tuck and K. Wayne Yang have theorized as “settler moves to innocence” (2012). These moves 
are strategies or positionings (within settler colonialism23) that attempt to reconcile settler guilt 
and complicity without actually following through on decolonial action. Settler moves to 
innocence are made possible by the “metaphorization” of decolonization, in which 
decolonization is limited to theoretical sites such as schools or methodologies, rather than 
literally decolonizing physically (a process which would include material changes in power 
relations/control over land, and the presence of settlers) (Tuck and Yang 2012). 
 I bring in settler moves to innocence here to trouble the history of American 
environmentalism, which has a historically complicated relationship with Native people(s) and 
land. I also believe that settler moves to innocence are kin with “moves to” existential 
exceptionalism. While settler moves to innocence are aligned specifically with the struggle for 
decolonization in a way that existential exceptionalism is not, both play a role in discursive 
obfuscation of systemic violence in discourses of planetary crisis. Existential exceptionalism 
does so by isolating the threat of planetary-scale crises from their contextual role as escalated 
                                                
23 Settler Colonialism can be thought of as a specific kind of coloniality, in which indigenous populations of a place 
are displaced by the colonizers, who put down “roots” and try to replace the indigenous populations (Wolfe 2006). 
Therefore, the violence of colonization is re-asserted each day and becomes a structure/system rather than a singular 
event.  
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forms of ongoing crisis within global, industrial capitalism and empire. Settler moves to 
innocence do so by attempting to remove literal decolonization from the conversation in order to 
protect settler futurity. Both are protecting a type of American (white, settler) normalcy which 
would be troubled by conversations about systemic drivers of planetary crisis (for instance, a 
critical look at settler capitalist relationships with land in the process of reconceptualizing human 
positionality as Ghosh calls for). But now I’m getting ahead of myself... 
 
Extinction and the Environmental Movement 
Wilderness, the “Frontier,” and Settler Colonialism.  
Concerns about extinction have long played a role in defining the concerns and activities 
of the environmental movement. The environmental movement emerged in the mid to late-
nineteenth century United States as a reaction to modernization and industrialization. As the 
settler “frontier” began to close, upper-class urban Americans) began to feel nostalgic for what 
was being lost (or destroyed, rather). This included:  nature (in the form of wilderness), identity 
in the form of rugged white male individualism (needed to close the frontier), and Native 
Americans (since closing the frontier hinged on their extermination, dispossession, and 
containment). I briefly discuss each of these in turn. 
According to William Cronon, “wilderness” emerged during a rush for resources at that 
time, and reified “wilderness” as the quintessential “pure” environment that must be protected in 
order to in turn, save humankind from itself (Cronon 1995). This resulted in the creation of the 
national park system that still operates in the United States and laid the foundation for other 
traditional conservation practices, which by and large “conserve” their subjects by limiting 
human use. Thus environmentalism designates “nature” and human “culture” as distinct and 
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dichotomous entities wherein the former “nature” as the tragic victim of the latter, human 
activity (Heise 2010).24 
The environmentalist move to preserve certain place as “wilderness” areas not only 
sparked the narrative that nature was declining as a result of modernization, but also worked to 
protect the already hollow American “origin story” or “national identity” that relied (relies) on a 
sense of perpetual frontier-ism (Cronon 1995). This “national identity” was by and largely based 
on the central valuation of rugged individualism, and it was also particularly conflated with 
white masculinity. Men like Teddy Roosevelt (who is well known for furthering nascent 
conservation efforts) idolized pioneer men as symbols of a time-past that was corrupted by 
stifling modernity - the irony, of course, is that the men who typically bought into this idea were 
made wealthy through the system of industrial, urban capitalism (Cronon 1995). This class 
distinction also explains why the “untouched” and unworked “wilderness” became the prize of 
environmentalism, as the wealthy framed these spaces which were intended for recreation, or 
temporary, refreshing “return” to more “primitive” roots (Cronon 1995). Thus, claiming 
“wilderness” was a move to reconcile American identity with modernity. It’s also a move that is 
explicitly entangled in settler colonialism, as the spaces of “wilderness” they sought to protect 
were not untouched, rather, they were lands that Native Americans had been forced off of over 
centuries of genocide, violence, and treaty violation.  
 Because American environmentalism emerged in nostalgic resistance to industrialization 
around the same time era that most large-scale armed conflict between Native peoples and the 
                                                
24 This binary is linked with a larger system of Western thought that includes (Cartesian) dualism, in which dual 
entities (like nature and culture, or male and female, mind and body, etc.) are thought to be not only mutually 
exclusive, but also uneven. Categories that differ from the cisheteronormative white male standard (like female, 
nature, body) are considered “other,” lesser. The same logic can be traced through the colonial matrix of power 
(Lugones 2010, Mignolo 2007). Classically, “nature” would be marked as lesser than human “culture” and thus 
intended for exploitation by humans. The emergence of environmentalism troubles the exploitation part (kind of), 
but not the dichotomy.  
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United States ceased, a similar nostalgia for the pre-modern past (and a “return to primitive 
origins”) has historically been projected onto living indigenous communities and individuals. In 
addition, extinction-based narratives of the nineteenth century (which emerged alongside 
environmentalism) often focused on the deaths of indigenous people(s) and extinctions of 
cultures (Sodikoff 2012). Patrick Brantlinger argues that colonial discourses of extinction 
emerged specifically because settlers were experiencing guilt, regret, or intense nostalgia not 
only over the (perceived) loss of nature, but also the loss of Native North Americans.25 The 
settlers began elegizing people who “they perceived to be living relics of their evolutionary 
past,” (Brantlinger 2003).26 Unshockingly, this did not particularly change power dynamics 
between settlers and Native people(s), but was rather still a project of American settler identity.  
 
Conservation and Biodiversity 
The environmental movement positioned “wilderness” as a pure” victim of human 
activity. Thus, environmental conservation focused on limiting human access to and use of 
certain land (like national parks). Of course, what was permissible “use” was defined by those 
who were most interested in “un-used” wilderness - wealthy elites (Cronon 1995). This included 
the continued exclusion of Native Americans who want to use their territory, a pattern that 
continues to this day.27  
                                                
25 This nostalgia was also part of the foundations of American Anthropology, whose “salvage ethnography” 
attempted to “save” what they could from people(s) who were assumed to be in the process of complete extinction.  
26  The United States government also hunted North American bison almost to extinction strategically to cripple 
Native North Americans. This is a brutal example of the continuation of the eliminatory logic of settler colonialism 
has resulted so often in genocide (Wolfe 2006).  
27 For example, there have been relatively recent examples of Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI) members 
being penalized for foraging ramps in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park (Lewis 2012).  
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Species threatened by extinction are frequently fetishized as emblems of both 
biodiversity and “wilderness” (Cronon 1995). Biodiversity is also assumed to be “mystically 
greater” in the wilderness, which orients conversations about biodiversity loss to exclude 
consideration of areas overwhelmingly dominated by humans (like urban areas).28 Conservation 
of endangered species, then, is also typically done with the same kinds of exclusionary practices.  
For instance, the result of the Save the Whales movement of the 1970’s (which sought to 
address whale over-hunting and impending extinction) resulted in a global moratorium on all 
commercial whaling (Stelios 2010). This too has conflicted with indigenous rights to self-
determination in the United States. The Makah of the Pacific Northwest had and have 
contingencies that want to resume whale-hunting, a practice that they have treaty rights and 
historical claim to (Sodikoff 2010). They are also hardly the culprits of over-whaling. Despite 
this, the pressure of environmental advocates and divided opinions has left the whaling ban 
enforced for years (Sodikoff 2010).  
Tension is also found in conservation efforts designed to protect species like Rhino that 
are over-hunted or “poached.” The criminalization of poaching, for instance, has led to 
increasingly militarized and violent forms of policing and law enforcement in areas like South 
Africa and Mozambique (Witter and Satterfield 2019). Militarized approaches in this case have 
escalated violence against poachers (and others caught in the crossfire), but have not done 
anything to address what might be driving poaching (Witter and Satterfield 2019). This type of 
conservation fails to address root causes and rather causes further social distress. ‘ 
 
Settler Moves to Innocence and Extinction.  
                                                
28 Although, it is probably a useful exercise to trouble this notion about urban spaces and think through the multi-
species entanglements that certainly still exist there. 
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 I argue that the context outlined in the prior two sections provides ample evidence that 
American environmentalist conceptions of “wilderness” (and the associated modes of 
conservation) are settler moves to innocence as defined by Tuck and Yang. By reifying 
“wilderness” as something to be protected out of concern for “loss of nature,” early 
environmentalists were making several moves in tandem: to absolve themselves of guilt over 
environmental degradation as a result of intensifying industrialization and capitalism, to retain 
the “frontier” that was/is so central to American identity, and to claim space for the wealthy to 
“return to primitive roots.” Because Native American struggle at the time was inextricably linked 
to the narratives of loss / extinction that spurned environmentalism, settler environmentalists 
were also making a move to acquit themselves from any regret over the violent elimination of 
Native groups. In addition, the ideas that they were newly “stewards of the land” and deeply 
connected by “primitive roots” to the (newly emptied) land was a move to naturalize this. Each 
of these turns is part of an attempt to secure American identity as a form of settler futurity, as 
well as the sense that conserved areas like parks were long term investments for the American 
people for a long-term or permanent settling. 
 When American environmentalists conflate  “wilderness” and biodiversity in the face of 
mass extinction, they move the threat of extinction into a similar discursive space. The threat of 
extinction to a certain species handled through American environmentalism and conservation 
reinforces the role of “wild” land as a pillar of American identity. In addition, American 
environmentalism  
 
Charismatic Species and Mass Extinction 
In practice, traditional conservation often advances around the protection of charismatic 
species. Centering conversations about extinction around individual species can limit the ability 
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to have conversations about large-scale, systemic drivers of mass extinction (like habitat loss and 
fragmentation driven by extractive and intensive capitalist industry). This occurs for a number of 
reasons. Among these, the extinction of so-called “keystone species” undermines ecosystem 
stability and its resilience. For example, bison maintain the health of the Great Plains and otters 
help control the populations of sea urchins and kelp. Without these species, habitat health would 
decrease and, even collapse. 
The scale at which biodiversity loss is easiest to understand and care about is the scale at 
which average humans can perceive and interpret - thus the focus on elephant over ant (Heise 
2010, Sodikoff 2011). It is arguably easiest to form multi-species relationships at that scale, and 
cultural meaning emerges more easily that way. Biologists and other scientists often refer to 
these species as “charismatic megafauna”. Third, and related, some species tend to evoke more 
empathy also tend to make for more successful funding targets; thus these (pandas, elephants, 
large primates) become the subject for conservation practice and publicity. 
These factors provide institutional reason that mass extinction comes to be understood 
through individual species. Conservation organizations target the general public with campaigns 
that take advantage of the cultural charisma of specific species to spread awareness and garner 
support of all kinds. For example, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), one of the most iconic 
conservation organizations of the past decades, takes an (endangered) Panda Bear as its logo, and 
fills its website with photos of tigers, koalas, and whales. Image 4.1 depicts the “Wildlife 
Conservation” page on the WWF website, where the tagline reads “Ensure the world’s most 
iconic species, including tigers, rhinos, and elephants, are secured and recovering in the wild,” 
overlaid over a photo of a man and a rhinoceros.29 In most cases, the large charismatic mammals 
                                                
29 https://www.worldwildlife.org/initiatives/wildlife-conservation, accessed April 12, 2020.  
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are money-makers. In the mainstream of a global system in which attempting to restore or 
preserve ecosystem health is rarely immediately profitable, the funds to advocate for  
and undertake conservation projects must be earned from donors of all sizes by convincing them 
iconic species, including tigers, rhinos, and elephants, are secured and recovering in the wild,” 
overlaid over a photo of a man and a rhinoceros.30 In most cases, the large charismatic mammals  
are money-makers. In the mainstream of a global system in which attempting to restore or 
preserve ecosystem health is rarely immediately profitable, the funds to advocate for and 
undertake conservation projects must be earned from donors of all sizes by convincing them that 
the monetary sacrifice is worth it. A cute face, impressive size, or familiar species helps the case. 
In most cases, campaigns around specific species are intended to raise support for the 
conservation of that species. That conservation is typically conducted through traditional 
methods common to the previously discussed environmentalism - which, again, means protecting 
precious biodiversity and “wilderness” by limiting human use by law. 
 As is seen in the previous section concerning both “Save the Whales” and the militarized  
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 https://www.worldwildlife.org/initiatives/wildlife-conservation, accessed April 12, 2020.  
Image 4.1 “WWF Site.” 
wwf.org, screenshot, 
accessed 14 March 2020.  
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fight against rhino poaching, this type of conservation operates through the legitimacy of state-
led protection, the willingness of environmentalists (like the anti-whaling protestors) to rally 
around cases and shame, and the exclusion of human “use” and “work” (defined through 
capitalist relationships between humans and land/ecosystems). I argue that overwhelmingly 
centering individual charismatic species in discourses of mass extinction contribute to the 
orientation of planetary crisis discourse towards environmentalism and traditional conservation. 
This does similar work as existential exceptionalism in that it doesn’t trouble “the normal.”  
This sort of re-direction of large-scale and troubling planetary problems into the same old 
environmentalism is likely part of the reason(s) that Doomerism, addressed in the following 
section, emerges. The nihilism and hopelessness of Doomerism is typically portrayed as a 
response to the Doomer’s disillusionment with “how things work,” they have given up on any 
cause and they believe that there is no point in acting (or that they personally cannot act). Yet at 
the same time, Doomer discourse is providing a platform for collective conversations about 
values and the struggle against crisis and human extinction in an honest way that American 
environmentalism is frankly failing to undertake.  
 
Human Extinction and Doomerism 
The Sixth Mass Extinction has also prompted people to wrestle with their own collective 
demise, the potential human extinction. Societies constitute diverse epistemologies, ontologies, 
cosmologies, subjectivities, and lived experiences; thus, they have diverse ways of 
understanding, interacting with, and responding to death, which is one thing all living beings 
actually do have in common. Beyond the inevitable anticipation of one’s own inevitable death, 
the anticipation of a shared collective death appears to bring with it a different type of affect and 
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anxiety. Contemporary Global North online cultures especially appear to have found pessimism, 
fatalism, indifferent nihilism, and all sorts of “hopelessness” easily rooting into discourses of 
planetary crisis. These sentiments often come with an accompanying shroud of anxiety, 
masculinity, and dark humor.  
One of the most common and salient manifestations of this which I have observed in 
recent years is the ostensibly offhand invocation “We’re All Going to Die.” As in the story that 
precedes this chapter, I have many times encountered the phrase thrown into conversation in 
order to justify a point or action that would be considered “irresponsible” - until, that is, 
impending human extinction makes it irrelevant. Why should I care about a career, we’re all 
going to die anyway? Why should I quit smoking, if we’re all going to die anyway? What’s the 
point of fighting against these things, if we’re just going to all die anyway? And for the close, “I 
hope that I go early.” 
 As I described in “Apocalypse,” religions have been speculating at the end of times since 
the proverbial beginning of times. “Normalcy” in relation to human extinction is the assumption 
that human extinction is a distant possibility, perhaps related to religious doomsday or the heat 
death of the universe. But when people flippantly predict existential threat as if it were a weather 
forecast, they are actively changing the rules of the game; they are predicting human extinction 
far early, and far more immediately. Like we (referring to all humans alive) might all die. That’s 
the prediction being made when “we’re all going to die” gets invoked. Another effect is sense of 
universalism. We are all going to die. Of course, this is an expression of fear, of speculation, and 
it is a possibility. But for now, it is worth taking positionality into account to ask “who is this 
‘we’ that is perishing so imminently?” For while humankind has arguably not been so close to 
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extinction since the Biblical Noah’s Ark story, all sorts of existential threats have been leveled at 
the dispossessed and exploited of the global system. Some extinctions have already occurred.  
Perhaps the phrase itself really isn’t even all that common (my sampling for observation 
is, quite potentially, biased). Yet the same affect(s) are present in other articulations of 
“hopeless” orientation towards crisis. In what follows, I examine the claim “we’re all going to 
die” and its shadow (human extinction) through a particular kind of discursive representation - 
that of Doomer-ism.  
The Doomer mentality (which I playfully term Doomer-ism) is certain that humankind 
will not be able to mobilize to avert complete disaster. Doomer-ism participates in and shapes 
conceptions of planetary crisis through a variety of mediums.31 But the most iconic and layered 
articulations of these is the Doomer meme.32 Internet lore holds that the Doomer emerged from 
the website 4-chan, which serves as place to share images. It then quickly proliferated throughout 
all kinds of social media circles.33 These Doomer memes are where the “we’re all going to die” 
mentality manifests as a singular white man. In the process, the Doomer character has becomes a 
constantly and collectively re-produced imagination of a generalized “the type of person who 
thinks these things.” 
The face of The Doomer is most often a derivative of a Wojack character from the 
aforementioned site, 4-chan, a meme image with a brooding face.34 The Doomer is a white male 
wearing a black beanie and smoking a cigarette. It’s meant to reflect  “real-life doomers”, who 
                                                
31 One of these is so-called “doomer-lit,” which is kin to sci-fi and “cli-fi” (fiction particularly focused on 
fantastic speculation about climate change). 
32 On April 15, 2020, the online Oxford dictionary defined meme as “a humorous image, video, 
piece of text, etc., that is copied (often with slight variations) and spread rapidly by Internet 
users.” 
33 4-Chan is infamous, and that context is important 
34 https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/doomer 
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do so often seem to be young white men who wear the black beanie and smoke American Spirits. 
Doomer-hood in memes is not always explicitly connected to the conditions of planetary crisis, 
although it is frequently implied and assumed by frequent consumers of Doomer discourse. More 
often, the Doomer is shown as dissatisfied, alienated, hopeless, and unmotivated to even try and 
change his circumstances because he knows that he will fail. The Doomer has different  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reasonings as to why ‘we’ are doomed. Among these: human nature, which is inevitably selfish, 
corrupt, and thus doomed (heh) to cause the means of their own extinction; fate (related to 
human nature or the will of God); and scientific consensus around climate change.  
In response, some of the descriptive captions on the classic “The 23 Year Old 
DOOMER” image include “High Risk for Opioid Addiction” and “Cares… but knows there’s 
nothing he can do.” It’s suggested that the Doomer, who has a good heart (because he cares), is 
consumed by the inevitability of failure and the immediacy of “Doomsday.”  
Image 4.2 “Classical Doomer.” 
Knowyourmeme.com 
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The face of the doomer then gets remixed across the internet for a myriad of meanings, 
often alongside a “Doomette,” a female counterpart to the male Doomer.  A classic 
Doomer/Doomette meme interaction either emphasizes the alienation of the Doomer, or involves 
a sexual dynamic between the two with a variety of outcomes. One image might involve a  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 4.3. “Doomer and 
Doomette.” Knowyourmeme.com 
 
 
 
Doomer bringing up “obscure” music to the Doomette, who does not know the selection or does 
not enjoy it, which would be alienating to him. Or the Doomer might ask out the Doomette, who 
either brutally rejects him or falls for him immediately. This interaction between Doomer and 
Doomette is also remixed, layered, deep-fried, and delivered with a strong sense of irony at 
various intervals.  
83 
 
The Doomer character and original meme format is not by definition directly related to 
the existential despair inspired by conditions of planetary crisis, many classic symptoms of 
doomer-hood are entangled pieces of the affective extremes that crisis sometimes inspires. The 
Doomer says things like “I’ve lost all faith in humanity.”  “We’re all going to die.” “There’s no 
point.” The optics of a young white man saying such things are loaded and sometimes even 
comical. In some ways it seems like the Doomer is typically coping with a hopelessness inspired 
by his own revelation that he is not, despite how he might have been raised as a white male, 
entitled to live forever and succeed in everything that he does.35  
Some of the core tenets of “Doomer-logic” which are relevant to planetary crisis are: 
● A sense that he is the victim of unprecedented crisis, and that the more cheerful 
cannot relate to his existential angst. 
● A constant state of this existential angst, which he fixates on and pessimistically 
associates with his own insecurities (such as a “lack of ability to attract women”). 
● Specific insecurity with his own ability to procure “success” or happiness, which 
is fed into by the neoliberal sense that masculine value is dependent on hyper-
individualist independence and self-sufficiency. 
 
These elements come to play in the decisions that the Doomer is said to make, especially in his 
relationship both to the Doomette and to society. And often, he is illustrated to act in similar 
patterns to real people in response to events like crises.  
 For example, in the below image, the Doomer has taken on Prepper or Hoarder 
characteristics and stockpiled toilet paper, N-95 masks, and guns in response to the COVID-19  
pandemic. The Doomette rejects his invitation to join him at his bunker, and instead is shown to  
                                                
35 And notably, he often projects this sense onto his own rejection by women, because the Doomer is both 
chronically straight and kin to the incel, whose personal demon is his own perceived inability to ever “get a girl.” 
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be partnered with a man (who is physically differentiated from the Doomer in a way that invokes 
the “Chad” template) who wants to “create a robust network of care for the vulnerable.”36 This 
sort of antithesis to the Doomer varies, but often the anti-Doomers are referred to as “Bloomers”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 4.4. “Doomer COVID 19.” 
Accessed 20 March 2020.  
 
 
- they are the people who have chosen to take a positive or hopeful outlook on life and, when the 
meme is engaging in the discourse of planetary crisis, usually they are indicated to have invested 
in some sort of theory of social change. Images such as the meme above are conveying a layered 
meaning that is complicated by the understandings of the viewer, but they are quickly digestible 
by individuals familiar with the format, templates, and references involved. Memes like Doomer 
                                                
36 The “Chad” template is a strong-jawed male character who originated in Incel culture as the counterpart to the 
Incel (a portmanteau of “involuntary celibate”; a male who believes that they will never be attractive to women 
because they were born with a weak skeleton/bone structure, while the Chad is a “normal” attractive male with no 
brains). Incel culture is infamously toxic and has resulted in real-world violence against women and against incels 
themselves, and therefore the invocation of the Chad-figure in Doomer memes (which positions the Doomer as the 
Incel) is worth attention.  
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memes have unwritten theses which spread quickly in digital social circles and shape discourse 
at a pace that is only limited by a participants ability to repost or remix. Everyone with a device 
to access the meme is a potential author, and there are rarely editors or publishing standards to be 
adhered to. Doomer humor has the power to rapidly shape the form of not only planetary-scale 
crisis discourse, but the attitudes that people have towards a Doomer perspective, and therefore 
real people that exhibit characteristics of Doomer orientation. 
In a way, Doomers fit into a similar sort of category as Preppers. Doomers certainly leave 
room for an apocalypse, but the extension of their logic results in human extinction, even if 
human extinction is not referred to in the Doomer image. Doomerism did not emerge from a 
vacuum, either. In essence, Doomerism is pessimism wrapped in white male privilege. It is a 
lack of “faith in society” and an excess of alienation that could likely be traced to the conditions 
of neoliberal capitalist society. What is significant about the Doomer is the position that he plays 
in representing very real, disillusioned young white men. In fact, I would argue that the figure of 
the fictional Doomer and its real-life referent are one manifestation of an orientation towards 
planetary crisis that registers its conditions as absolutely exceptional. 
Our own extinction as a species lurks in every conversation in which crisis, emergency, 
or apocalypse is mobilized, whether spoken or unspoken. Existential threat is not equally 
experienced, nor is it novel to the extent that Doomer pessimism is warranted. And while 
Doomers clearly feel alienated by society, they are still holding on to the values of that 
neoliberal, cisheteronormative, white settler society. The Doomer works in a white affective 
register, speculating at the glimmer of potential of destructive being leveled at the white meme 
man. 
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 That said, Doomer-ism still resonates with me (much as Deep Adaptation and certain 
Prepper practices do). The threat of planetary chaos and extinction-level events is overwhelming. 
I think that there’s probably a little Doomer in most of us. But I still argue that to succumb to the 
hopelessness of the Doomer is to buy into existential exceptionalism and betray the pursuit of a 
world without globalized industrial capitalism. I argue that the co-production of Doomer memes 
is an active and lively catalyst for collective conversations about how to approach planetary 
crisis and human extinction. Hopefully it’s just a first step.  
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INTERLUDE IV  |  MULTI-CASUALTY TRIAGE SYSTEMS 
 
After running out of the Stone Fire, I felt like fire was following me around Southern 
California. I thought I might be safe at my next project, which was in the San Jacinto Mountains 
outside of Palm Springs. But on the first day of our third hitch there, I looked into the sky while 
rolling rocks and noticed a strange color in the sky. I swore it was fire, but this new crew I had 
been placed with laughed me off. By that evening, there was ash raining from the sky and the sun 
burned a deep and unsettling pink color, and the next morning we were evacuated. Our 
replacement project was clearing a fire break around the boundaries of a nature preserve, and the 
next was a seed collection project in a canyon which had burned two years ago. The topography 
still showed the scars from the fireline dug by dozers.  
At the next project, at Lake Silverwood, we were hauling brush through an area that had 
burned just a year ago. Everything was still charred and black, and there were splashes of red-
pink fire retardant on the leaves of the surrounding unburnt areas. On the second day, we saw 
(and smelled) the tell-tale signs of a fire nearby, but it was not quite so urgent that they made us 
leave. By the final day, we were throwing branches into a dumpster and watching the smoke 
grow thicker and thicker until the asthmatics among us refused to work any more. And then we 
heard that a fire was burning one road over from our hostel housing in Dulzura.  
When the fire was burning near Lake Silverwood, it wouldn’t leave my mind. I was 
convinced that it was going to top the ridge and that we would have to book it to escape. My 
friends would take me on walks and try to distract me, trusting that the crew leader knew what he 
was doing. But at the same time, I had caught a bug. When I left California and returned to 
school, I took a Wildland Fire class and learned the fire ecology and management techniques that 
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I wish I had known back in the Stone Fire. We conducted a prescribed burn. I learned that I 
loved walking through the flames in no-mex coveralls (although this fire in Appalachia after a 
rainy month didn’t burn hot or fast at all). And as part of the class, we were given a small purple 
booklet titled “The Incident Response Pocket Guide,” (IRPG), which contained as much 
information about wildland firefighting as the National Wildfire Coordinating Group could 
possibly see fit. We were encouraged to read it in our down time.  
Page 113 (of the 2019 IRPG, as it is continually updated) is “Multi-Casualty Triage 
System.” In the multi-casualty triage system, there are four colors used for classification. The 
first is red (immediate priority), and there are accompanying criteria (like “serious, life-
threatening injury” and “radial pulse absent, capillary refill more than 2 seconds”). The second is 
yellow (delayed priority, “can follow simple commands”), and the third is green (minor, “all 
walking wounded”). The fourth is black, which simply indicates already dead or dying. It made 
sense to me that they would have a criteria for triage, since wildland fire is an emergency 
service. I didn’t really think about it after I read it the first time. That is, until reports started 
trickling in from Italy’s COVID-19 lockdown that hospitals were overwhelmed, and that doctors 
were being forced to conduct a multi-casualty triage system. I felt a little overwhelmed by the 
stories that were coming out. How do you decide who gets sacrificed for the greater good?  
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CHAPTER FIVE | CONCLUSION: PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES OF COLLECTIVE 
IMAGINATION IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 
 
“Humans Are the Virus:” COVID-19 Discourse and EcoFascism 
The COVID-19 pandemic differs from other planetary crises like extinction and climate 
change in that it appears to primarily affect humans. However, some other animals are also 
affected and responding to the change in human behavior patterns. Domesticated dogs, for 
example, seem to be pleased that their companions are saying home (cats less so). There have 
also been widespread reports from heavily locked down areas that groups of larger mammals are 
entering human-dominated landscapes. The sika deer of Nara, Japan, accustomed to eating Shika 
Senbei crackers provided by tourists, are now wandering the city centre, blocking traffic and 
venturing into train stations (O’Connell 2020). A flock of sheep was also sighted visiting a 
McDonald’s in Wales (Woodyatt 2020). Limited travel and other behavior changes have also 
meant lower global CO2 emissions. While these examples of change are notable, they’ve also 
provided fuel and fodder to a renewed and newly problematic discourse of crisis: ecofascism. 
“Ecofascism” is an authoritarian response to environmental crises wherein humans 
(particularly brown and black folks, migrants, and others “othered” by the coloniality of power) 
are blamed as the problem and citizens are forced to make sacrifices for the greater good37. In 
response to reports of changed nonhuman animal behavior and lessened rates of pollution, some 
                                                
37 Ecofascism has ideological roots in white supremacy, as well as Malthusian (and neo-Malthusian) logics (Dyett 
and Thomas 2019). Specifically, self-identified eco-fascists, including early American environmentalist and racist 
Madison Grant, used the ideology to justify such practices as eugenics and the suppression of migration as necessary 
for the protection of the environment as well as for the maintenance of white supremacy (Purdy 2015). Numerous 
perpetrators of mass violence and terrorism have cited eco-fascism as a motivational factor for their actions, 
including the 2019 El Paso Wal-Mart shooting, the 2019 Christchurch, NZ mosque shooting, and the 2011 terrorist 
attacks in Norway (Darby 2019). Beyond episodes of “lone-wolf” terrorism, some consider ecofascism as 
foundational to the ideology of the German Third Reich, as well as state-led projects of forced sterilization of black 
and brown people (Dyett and Thomas 2019). 
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have taken to social media to make this statement (or some variant): “Humans are the Virus, 
Coronavirus is the cure” (See Image 5.1). The logic of this statement follows that the 
anthropogenic roots (i.e., people) of planetary-scale crisis are being “cured” by a virus killing off 
large numbers of people. Terming COVID-19 as a “cure” suggests that the ailment is people. 
And while contemporary planetary crisis has anthropogenic drivers, there is no distinction 
between polluting industries and “too many'' poor, desperate people in the term Human. Tropes 
like this (i.e., the existence of “too many” people) reinforce Neo-Malthusian and ecofascist 
logics, long prevalent in the other discourses of planetary crisis I have discussed in this thesis. 
With the onset of COVID-19, ideas rooted in logics of ecofascism are apparently becoming ever 
more active participants in planetary crisis discourse.38  
For instance, a tweet published by an account called Extinction Rebellion (XR) East 
Midlands states “Earth is healing. The air and water is clearing. Corona is the cure. Humans are 
the disease! #ClimateCrisis #CoronaCrisis #coronavirus.” The images that they included show 
stickers posted on a public lamp post reading “Corona is cure, humans are the disease.” (See 
Image 5.1). Extinction Rebellion is a global environmental network started in the UK which is  
 
 
                                                
38 It is also notable that “Humans are the Virus” rhetoric is playing a similar role to Doomer memes in some ways - 
while the initial posting reinforces ecofascist ideas, these statements have also opened up a space for public and 
collective discourse on ecofascism. Some of that has occurred in theoretical, conversational push-back denouncing 
these statements and their ideological roots. This is the version that I would advocate for as actually combatting 
ecofascism. However, a lot of it, like with Doomers, is happening through meme-ification, as “Humans are the 
Virus” memes proliferate, depicting parodies of the “return of animals to their natural habitat.” For instance, I was 
texted an image the other day of a pair of tan Timberland boots sitting alone on the platform of a New York subway 
station. The caption read “Timbs are roaming free in NY. Nature is healing (praying hands emoji),” which positions 
the iconic cultural association between Timbs and New York as the “wildlife in its natural habitat.” Other images 
show toilet paper on store shelves, dinosaurs emerging, and human objects like porcelain toilets and razor scooters 
in lakes (each of which is absurd in a different way, and therefore makes a different statement). In some ways, these 
memes only aid the spread of the un-parodied trope and its memorability, as they don’t always clearly articulate a 
message that disarms ecofascism. But they are certainly a form of discourse. And they’re so damn funny sometimes.  
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Image 5.1 “XR Midlands Tweet” 
@xr_east. Accessed 24 Mar. 2020  
 
 
 
 
 
 
well-known for staging disruptive and performative protests and other direct actions in the 
interest of addressing “global climate emergency” (rebellion.earth). One of XR’s “principles and 
values” (listed on their website) is autonomy and decentralization, which in practice means that 
there is no directly enforced hierarchy, and “anyone who follows these core principles and values 
can take action in the name of Extinction Rebellion” (rebellion.earth). This does mean that the 
people of XR East Midlands could make these “Humans are the disease” stickers and post them 
in public with the XR logo with no immediate oversight. However, in this case, the plot further 
thickens, as Extinction Rebellion Midlands has stated to BBC that this was a “fake Twitter 
account” not representative of them. However, regardless of the official position of XR (which is 
officially distancing itself from this statement and its accompanying ideology), or the 
legitimacy/illegitimacy of the account in representing the actions of all of XR East Midlands, the 
tweet has traveled. It was spread across the internet with the visuals and name of XR. Ecofascist 
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rhetoric is permeating discourses of planetary crisis, and whether it is “self-aware” or intentional 
in its positioning or not, it is becoming associated with “mainstream” crisis-oriented 
organizations.  
This story emphasizes the importance of carefully examining not only the stories told 
about crisis, but also the storytellers themselves, and the ideological roots of their discourse. The 
continuing emergence of ecofascist and neo-Malthusian arguments in planetary crisis discourse 
reinforces part of the argument that I have been building in this thesis - that removing planetary 
crisis from its systemic context not only limits the capacity of collective imaginaries to 
conceptualize effective reactions, but also protects globalized neoliberal normalcy and opens the 
door further for the promotion of dangerous ideas.  
 
“Sacrifice the Weak” 
The “Humans are the virus” logic holds that COVID-19 deaths are in some way deserved 
and justified, sacrifices needed to maintain the long-term health of the planet. Some have 
followed the logic further onto the newly re-fertilized grounds of sacrificing the others. Take the 
image below, which was taken at a “Re-Open Tennessee” protest. The person featured in the 
image stands on the side of the road, ironically masked (although it may be for anonymity rather 
than personal safety), with a homemade red sign that reads “Sacrifice The Weak. Re-Open TN.”  
“Re-Open” protestors across the United States are taking to the streets to demand that the 
states lift “stay at home” orders and business closures in favor of “business as usual” (against the 
counsel of epidemiologists). The reasonings are not uniform, but they tend to fall into similar and 
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overlapping categories. First, that the economy shouldn’t be sacrificed for public health, but 
rather that public health should be sacrificed for the sake of the economy.39 And secondly, that it  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is the (God-given) right of American citizens to patronize whatever businesses they so choose, 
unlimited by the state. This is a neoliberal assertion of rights - that “rights” entail the freedom for 
citizens to do what they want (especially, consume), unfettered by the state, rather than “rights” 
as a suggestion that citizens have a right to safety and healthcare. This may be oversimplified, 
but if the signs are to be believed, people are willing to risk their lives and the lives of others to 
eat at Baskin Robbins, go to Disneyland, and get haircuts. Flouting public safety measures has 
become a sign of right-wing identity. Using the language of “Sacrifice the Weak,” in this 
                                                
39 The path to this conclusion likely differs depending on the individual. In some cases, it is a (MIS)calculation that 
prolonged economy “closure” is more of a risk to the “greater good” than the public health risk. In other cases, I 
think that people just don’t want to see their profits disappear and the neoliberal state doesn’t want to keep paying 
unemployment or giving out loans/protections to small businesses at the rate that is has been.  
Image 5.2. “Sacrifice the Weak.” 
Facebook. Verified by News Media. 
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context, the sign-carrier is making the argument that rights to neoliberal freedoms (no state 
control) are the greater good for which the weak must be sacrificed.  
Calls to sacrifice the weak for the economy or “freedom” are especially insidious given 
that there are ever-escalating reports in the US that Black communities and Native nations like 
the Navajo Nation are experiencing highly disproportionate case and death rates (Kendi 2020, 
Morales 2020). The disparity persists because systems operating through the coloniality of power 
(including neoliberal globalization and settler colonialism) exclude black and indigenous 
communities from wealth, critical infrastructure, and healthcare, as well as subjected to 
environmental injustice (Breslow 2020). The same can be said about the incarcerated (another 
group with disproportionate numbers of Black people). As of April 27th, prison and detention 
centers make up 8 out of 10 of the largest clusters of COVID-19 cases (Hale 2020). As for 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainees, fear of COVID-19 outbreaks in already 
dehumanizing and unsanitary conditions has inspired hunger strikes (Katz 2020). As of April 16, 
2020, ICE self-reportedly released 700 immigrant detainees with ankle monitors to decrease risk, 
but around 32,300 people remain (Katz 2020). In addition, there is a bigotry against all disabled 
folks, the immunocompromised, the elderly, and other people who might be determined as 
“weaker” that an able body in the face of COVID-19 implicit in the call for sacrifice that Ms. 
Tennessee is making.  
The public negotiation of crisis-threat and sacrifice described here exists in the same field 
as the stories told in Chapter 2 (Emergency), on Climate Emergency. “Climate Emergency” is a 
grassroots mobilization, an appeal to the federal government to declare a state of emergency. In 
that context, climate organizers refer to the logics of state-led sacrifice that accompanied the 
WWII mobilization. “Climate Emergency,” and the declaration of “state of emergency” by the 
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state opens up a space of “legal suspension” or exception in which the disruption of normalcy is 
positioned to justify the legitimacy of the state to bypass its own laws and make determinations 
about sacrifice “for the greater good.” Storying planetary crisis as “emergency” contextualizes 
the threat within the politicality of the state and the precedent of the past. 
The emergency chapter also shows that a certain amount of sacrifice (including negative 
sacrifice) is already normalized in American society. While states of “emergency” do open up 
new spaces for legitimate power to be wielded by the state, legal suspension and exceptionalism 
are also part of normal practice, especially in border areas (metaphorical and literal) where 
imperial relationships are active (Sundberg 2015). In a similar sense, the US is already 
sacrificing the weak. And frankly, that doesn’t bode well, as COVID-19 is being likened to the 
“harbinger” of climate change. The austere response of the government in the face of an actually 
unprecedented global pandemic plays into what Masco called “the crisis in crisis.” The state is 
creating crisis both in its action and in its inaction.  
 
Apocalyptic Normalcy and Existential Threat 
Relative to emergency (around which there are political measures being taken up) and 
extinction (which is measured via science), there’s much less of a scale or a measuring stick for 
assessing whether an event meets the “apocalypse” threshold. It’s a narrative, not a classification, 
a discursive site of tension and negotiation between what is imagined to be “Normal” and what is 
imagined to unsettle and ultimately transform that normalcy. 
Chapter Three, Apocalypse, brought the transformative powers of apocalypse into 
conversation with disaster capitalism and, in particular, the Shock Doctrine. Disaster capitalism 
organizes and energizes crises as profitable markets, while the shock of apocalypse cleans the 
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slate for neoliberal policy reform and those markets that thrive off disaster. Neoliberal values 
also place the load of personal security onto individuals (rather than the state).  
 
These phenomena can all be seen in COVID-19 response by the United States. First, 
some companies (like Zoom and Amazon) and already wealthy individuals (like Bezos and 
Zuckerberg) are rapidly accumulating more wealth. Second, responsibility for personal security 
is so “bootstrapped” that people are being encouraged to make cloth masks (less effective than 
N-95 masks) from old t-shirts and socks. Third, some are using COVID-19 as an excuse for or a 
distraction from neoliberal activity (like President Trump’s recent attacks on the US Postal 
Service), as well as the limitation of all legal immigration. The shock of global pandemic 
scrambles, disorients, and then reorients social norms, including individuals’ expectations about 
effective, fair and appropriate governance, in ways that make neoliberal change easier to 
implement. Joseph Masco’s “the crisis in crisis” (2017) is also applicable in this context - a 
political sphere limited by neoliberal governance and a normalized state of crisis in turn 
normalize an austere crisis-response. 
As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, the “apocatainment” industry is another way that 
apocalypse works into disaster capitalism. In brief, the narratives of apocalypse sells, some more 
than others. Blockbuster North American apocatainment movies often have a “white affective” 
narrative at their core, which means that white American normalcy is speculating at the 
possibility of its own destruction and, as often, its own ability to conquer and overcome. Usually 
white affective apocalypse stories involve an ending or intervention in the film that centers white 
masculinity and American neoliberal values as the “normal” to be returned to post-apocalypse, or 
the moral grounds which helps a protagonist thwart some life-threatening plot. White affective 
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stories code “apocalyptic” narrative in mainstream discourse as a potential end to American 
normalcy, which is centered as worth saving. On the flip side, apocalyptic narratives used in 
speculative and science fiction like Parable of the Sower position American normalcy as the 
crisis, which exemplifies the existential exceptionalist logic of white affective narrative.  
 In the context of crisis, similar tensions build between two different interpretations of 
crisis. In contrast to the aforementioned “re-open” protestors, strikes of “essential workers” are 
gaining traction. “#generalstrike” was trending on twitter a few weeks ago. Healthcare workers 
are striking in demand of basic Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). On May 1, International 
Workers Day, workers from some of the USA’s largest corporations, including Amazon/Whole 
Foods, Walmart, FedEx, Target, and Instacart, all planned strikes. They demand compensation 
for unpaid time off, hazard pay, sick leave, proper PPE, and real cleaning supplies (Neuman 
2020).40 The “normalcy” of before hasn’t necessarily been obliterated, rather, it has been 
escalated. But some see the lock-down measures as a threat to returning to normalcy, and yet, the 
“normalcy” of before hasn’t necessarily been obliterated, but rather, it has been escalated.  
Chapter Three also examined tensions in the different ways people conceive of and enact 
“preparation” for apocalypse. Conceptualizations of crisis that derived from old survivalist 
discourse, like Jim Bakker’s scare-tactic evangelical apocalypse infomercials, and other white 
affective narratives, literally buy into individualism. Their modes of prepping involve securing 
oneself and ones immediate family first against a perceived threat (whether it be hordes of 
desperate and violent people or a bombing from a foreign nation). Deep Adaptation, on the other 
hand, centers collective conversations about collective resiliency and reconciliation as a starting 
place for preparation for overcoming ongoing and impending climate-related disasters.  
                                                
40 My friend that works at Target told me that they’ve been told to clean their self-checkout machines and keypads 
with glass cleaner.... Which will not kill COVID-19. 
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Similarly, in the time of COVID-19, some are choosing to stock-pile and some are 
participating in mutual aid. Because apocalypse is a powerful cultural narrative, it opens 
windows to imagine potentials beyond the state and culture as it is known now - but it is also a 
field overrun by profit-mongers and white affective narrative. As the Preppers and discussions of 
Apocalypse show, how crisis is figured by discourse has real power to orient both individuals 
and collectives towards what modes of action are most proper and most effective for weathering 
the coming weather… 
 
Settler Normalcy and Nihilist Exceptionalism 
In Chapter Four, Extinction, I demonstrated that since its inception, American 
environmentalism has used extinction as reason to reify wilderness and enact its conservation (by 
exclusion). I characterize these tactics, using the terminology of Tuck and Yang (2012), as a 
“Settler Move to Innocence.” This means that American environmentalism obscures the root 
causes of extinction and avoids culpability for harms enacted on indigenous peoples, all the 
while keeping settler identity out of crisis, and in doing so, protects settler futurity. This 
investment in settler “normalcy” and its relationship with land, combined with the conservatory 
focus on charismatic species as emblematic for their concerns about extinction, removes the 
threat of mass extinction (and human extinction) from the true nature and history of planetary 
crisis. In turn, discourses of mainstream environmentalism limit the capacity of collective 
imaginaries to conceptualize the threat of short-term human extinction.  
“Doomer” mentality, on the other hand, takes short-term human extinction as an 
inevitability and responds with nihilism. This approach buys into existential exceptionalism, as 
the Doomer is portrayed as being so overwhelmed by the perceived inevitability of human 
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extinction and social collapse that he has given up the fight before he even began it. However, 
the representation of Doomer-ism in Doomer memes is a dynamic and lively site of collective 
conversations about existential threat, privilege, and social change. Doomer memes that push 
back on Doomer ideology and suggest counter-arguments to the nihilism they champion are part 
of an ongoing, largely online conversation about how best to respond to planetary crisis (both 
individually and collectively). These are the kinds of conversations that need to happen in order 
to combat existential exceptionalism, as they try to imagine and enact alternatives to the options 
for action that we are given by “normal” conventions and discourses. 
 
Escalation vs. Exceptionalism: Pushing the Limits of Collective Imagination 
Recall from the introduction Masco’s contention that in the US, there is a “crisis in crisis” in 
which the term and concept of crisis have become so overwhelming and overused that the term 
“crisis” has lost its affective power to mobilize response (2017). In the conditions of the “crisis 
in crisis,” the political sphere is limited and languages for collective social improvement are lost 
because neoliberal governance systems repeatedly break the social contract (Masco 2017). 
Masco also suggests that “crisis talk today seeks to stabilize an institution, practice, or reality 
rather than interrogate the historical conditions of possibility for that endangerment to occur.” 
(2017: 73) In this thesis, I have come to understand existential exceptionalism as a part of this 
crisis in crisis. Again, existential exceptionalism is the (false) sense of novelty that 
environmentalism and/or the climate movement attribute to planetary crisis (Heglar 2019). I 
suggest that existential exceptionalism is a part of “the crisis in crisis” because by framing the 
existential threat of planetary crisis as novel, existential exceptionalism removes planetary crisis 
from its political context and systemic roots. This removal hides histories of crisis and existential 
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threat which led up to contemporary planetary crisis and therefore normalizes them into the web 
of crisis which dulls and dilutes the power of the concept. Framing the existential threat of 
planetary crisis as entirely exceptional also limits the formation and capacity of collective 
imaginaries to respond to planetary crisis by removing the context and root causes of crisis, a 
power which in turn contributes to the limitation of the political sphere and loss of language 
critical for collective improvement.  
 Existential exceptionalism’s power to hide the political context of crisis also serves to 
protect and justify the status quo (including the actions or inactions of the neoliberal state) by 
absolving systems of power (like neoliberal globalization) from complicity. To buy into 
existential exceptionalism in the first place is an indicator of privilege, suggesting that the 
normalcy before was just fine and that climate change, or COVID-19, or whichever crisis needs 
to be defeated in order to return right back to that normalcy. Sites of discourse like American 
environmentalism, white affective apocalypse stories and Doomer-ism contribute to this. Each of 
these discursive phenomena are not only influenced by (and reproduce) the coloniality of power, 
but also promote stories that disrupt the capacity of collective imaginations to break through the 
illusion of “normalcy.” 
 An existential exceptionalist orientation towards crisis will likely only lead to techno-fix 
solutions or institutionally mandated sacrifices (of the “weak”), just as Ghosh suggests happens 
in a state of Great Derangement. As both Masco and Ghosh (and many others) suggest, actually 
understanding and responding to planetary crisis means re-conceptualizing not only human 
positionality in the planetary ecosystem, but also the hegemonic power systems and “normalcy” 
which got us here. Exceptionalist understandings of crisis simply do not have the language or 
scope of understanding to address the cultural shifts that need to be a part of that process. To 
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clarify, there are certain elements of planetary crisis which can be considered “new” or 
abnormal, like the combination of a global scale with threats that “don’t discriminate,” so to 
speak (like the COVID-19 coronavirus itself, which is a virus which will attempt to infect 
whoever it comes in contact with). But the path to this contemporary moment of planetary crisis 
(and how crises play out in relation to each other) is undeniably a systemic problem with 
complex drivers like neoliberal globalization and the coloniality of power. In this light, the more 
accurate and fair explanation of planetary crisis might be an “escalation of normalcy,” one that 
places increased pressure on planetary systems and undermines the capacity for life.  
Storying planetary crisis as an escalation of normalcy rather than an exceptional 
phenomenon acknowledges the type of normalized sacrifices and unjust systems which 
orchestrate(d) planetary crisis. The failure to link planetary crisis with systems of power like 
neoliberal globalization and the coloniality of power incapacitates collective imaginaries from 
sufficiently addressing the conditions of crisis. This is a function of protecting hegemonic power 
systems (like American empire, the fossil-fuel based market, and white supremacy) which would 
be threatened by a collective power which can imagine an alternative way of living without 
trillionaires, without police, and without oil. However, there is also the added element that those 
of a privileged position in American normalcy also don’t have the same degree of incentive or 
pressure to push the limits of collective imaginations or reconceptualize human positionality in 
the world, simply because normalcy is a comfortable place. It’s easier just to buy into existential 
exceptionalism, donate money to a Save the Whales campaign, swear off the numbing drama of 
partisan politics, and kick back to watch an apocatainment flick.41 The thing is, pushing limits of 
the collective imaginary in response to planetary-scale crisis and taking action outside of 
                                                
41 I know that it’s easier because I grew up white and middle class, and it’s worth noting that it’s where a lot of 
Doomers seem to come from too.  
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capitalist or governmental frameworks likely involves a re-distribution of sacrifice and power, 
and it involves questioning American epistemes (undermining the security some find in being 
sure of Truths).  
But planetary crisis is already here, and it has been, it has been escalating and it will 
likely continue to. I believe that there has to be a better way. Or rather, better ways plural, and 
many ways within many different worlds (as Sousa Santos and Escobar’s Epistemologies of the 
South might posit). We might all die (well, we certainly all will at some point), but why give up 
trying when we haven’t yet exhausted the possibilities for meaningful, generative, and much 
more lively response.  
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